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ARTICLES
FOURTH AMENDMENT FIDUCIARIES
Kiel Brennan-Marquez*
Fourth Amendment law is sorely in need of reform. To paraphrase
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United States v. Jones, the idea that
people have no expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared
with third-parties—the foundation of the widely reviled “third-party
doctrine”—makes little sense in the digital age.
In truth, however, it is not just the third-party doctrine that needs
retooling today. It is the Fourth Amendment’s general approach to the
problem of “shared information.” Under existing law, if A shares
information with B, A runs the risk of “misplaced trust”—the risk that B
will disclose the information to law enforcement. Although the misplaced
trust rule makes sense as a default, it comes under strain in cases where A
and B have no relationship of trust and the only reason that A shares
information with B is to obtain a socially valuable (and practically
indispensable) service. In such cases, I argue that the doctrine should treat
B as an “information fiduciary” and analyze B’s cooperation with law
enforcement—whether voluntary or compelled—as a Fourth Amendment
search.
The argument develops in three parts. Part I demonstrates that the Court
has already identified two settings—if only implicitly—where fiduciary-style
protections are necessary to safeguard constitutional privacy: medical
care and hotels. When A is a patient and B is a doctor, and, likewise, when
A is a guest and B is a hotel manager, the Court has been reluctant to
apply the “misplaced trust” rule. Rightly so: the principle is mismatched
to the underlying relationship. From there, Part II fleshes out the
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normative argument. Put simply, we do not “trust” information fiduciaries,
in the everyday sense, at all. So it makes little sense—normatively, or even
semantically—to speak of trust being “misplaced.” Rather, the information
is held for the benefit of the sharing party, and its use should be constrained
by implied duties of care and loyalty. Finally, Part III lays the groundwork
for determining who are “Fourth Amendment fiduciaries.” The Article
concludes by exploring various practical metrics that courts might adopt to
answer this question.
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INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment law has long embraced the proposition that
disclosure invites betrayal. If A shares information with B, and B relays the
information to the police, A can claim no constitutional harm. Beginning
with Katz v. United States,1 the watershed case prohibiting warrantless
wiretaps, modern doctrine has focused on walling off private relationships
from intrusion by law enforcement. But the doctrine has nothing to say—
by design—about the possibility that those relationships are built on
“misplaced trust.”2 Whatever else the Fourth Amendment protects against,
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124–26 (1984) (finding no Fourth
Amendment violation when a FedEx worker dismantled a customer’s package, identified
contraband, and reported the results to law enforcement); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and
the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (“Had Mrs. Coolidge, wholly on her own initiative, sought out her
husband’s guns and clothing and then taken them to the police station to be used as evidence
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one thing it does not protect against is the risk of another person voluntarily
cooperating with the authorities.
This Article scrutinizes the “misplaced trust” rule. In a different age—
when far less information was shared with others—this principle may have
been sustainable in its strong form. But it is no longer. In today’s world,
we constantly disclose vast amounts of information to digital
intermediaries: email providers, social media sites, and the like. A rote
application of the misplaced trust rule would leave these intermediaries
categorically free to take up the mantle of law enforcement: to serve as
“Big Brother’s little helpers,”3 as long as the decision to do so is neither
instigated nor remunerated by the state.4 This status quo is intolerable, and
it will only become more intolerable as time goes on.
My position is not that the misplaced trust rule should be discarded. To
the contrary, the rule makes sense—as a default—on both practical and
normative grounds. My position is that the misplaced trust rule is only a
default, and Fourth Amendment doctrine should become more attentive to
its exceptions. Analytically, those exceptions are easily summarized. The
misplaced trust rule should not apply to information shared with
“information fiduciaries.”5 If the nature of A and B’s relationship is such
against him, there can be no doubt under existing law that the articles would later have been
admissible in evidence.”); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (“[H]owever
strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not
protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302
(1966) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment [does not protect] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a
person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”).
3. I borrow this phrase from Chris Hoofnagle. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s
Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package
Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004) (exploring the
ways in which private data companies collaborate with law enforcement).
4. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is “wholly
inapplicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge
of any governmental official”). Lower courts, tasked with applying this standard, have
focused on the existence of (1) compulsion, and (2) remuneration. See, e.g., Cassidy v.
Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although a wholly private search falls outside the
scope of the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted by private individuals at the instigation
of a government officer or authority constitutes a governmental search for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 341, 344
(4th Cir. 2003) (holding an anonymous hacker’s search for child pornography did not violate
the Fourth Amendment—despite being a crime—because the Government did not
“participate in,” but rather “passively accept[ed] . . . a private party’s search efforts”); United
States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a technician’s discovery of
files on defendant’s computer, “made pursuant to . . . maintenance work” that “[t]he
Government had no knowledge” of and “did not instruct” the technician to perform, is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment; also noting that one consideration in determining
whether a search was private is “whether the Government offered the private party a
reward”).
5. See Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries in the Digital Age, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 5,
2014, 4:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/information-fiduciaries-in-digital-age.
html [http://perma.cc/VN5D-JBZP]; see also Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an
Election Without Anyone Ever Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerry
mandering (exploring, among other things, the idea that Facebook is an information
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that B is obligated to prioritize A’s interests over her own, B should not be
free to betray information shared by A. In those circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment should not only constrain the way law enforcement officials
gather information, but it should also constrain the way that private
actors—information fiduciaries—transmit it.6
This Article proceeds in three parts.
Part I is exegetical.
Notwithstanding the absolute language that judges use—and commentators
echo—when describing the misplaced trust rule, in fact there are two
settings in which the Court’s jurisprudence has already been sensitive to the
need for heightened protection due to the types of relationships involved:
medical care and hotels. When A is a patient and B is a doctor, and
likewise, when A is a guest and B is a hotel manager, the Court has been
reluctant to apply the misplaced trust rule. And rightly so: in both settings,
it seemed apparent to the Court—even if existing doctrine offered no
vocabulary to say so explicitly—that the rule would disserve, and perhaps
disintegrate, the underlying relationship.
Equipped with these examples, Part II turns to normative analysis.
Although there has been no shortage of commentary in recent years about
the need to retool Fourth Amendment law for the digital age, the misplaced
trust rule survives unscathed. Instead, the reform effort has focused
primarily on Smith v. Maryland7 and United States v. Miller8—progenitors
of the so-called “third-party doctrine”—which hold that we have no
expectation of privacy in the dialed numbers we share with phone
companies9 or in the financial information we share with banks.10 In the
shadow of Smith and Miller, scholars (and dissident judges) have been
scrambling to explain why digital communication enjoys any Fourth
Amendment protection, even from intrusion by law enforcement.11 The
fiduciary) [http://perma.cc/TR9M-R29X].
These efforts have much in common,
conceptually, with work that Neil Richards has done, along with Dan Solove and Woody
Hartzog, on the normative relationship between privacy, confidentiality, and trust. See Neil
M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007); Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law (Aug. 4, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2655719 [http://perma.cc/Z8VD-Y9W2].
6. Although reform efforts have not been entirely insensitive to this issue, they have
tended to focus (for obvious reasons, given the doctrinal pedigree) on the law enforcement
side of the equation. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT
ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS 99–111 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]
(outlining the criteria that law enforcement should be required to satisfy before seizing
records from institutional third parties). Although this is certainly a step in the right
direction, in my view a full account of constitutional privacy today must also interrogate the
other side of the equation: To what extent should third parties be able to cooperate with law
enforcement?
7. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
8. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
9. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736.
10. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436.
11. On the judicial front, see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that in “the digital age,” it may be “necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1,
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results have been mixed. Although the effort to marginalize Smith and
Miller certainly improves on the status quo, it also leaves unresolved—
indeed, unexamined—the distinct privacy concerns that arise when
intermediaries decide to aid the authorities voluntarily. Many of the
practices that rightfully alarm scholars today—for example, the collection
of bulk metadata—would still be alarming (perhaps even more so) if they
were spearheaded by private actors, not at the behest of law enforcement,
but with the purpose of assisting law enforcement. In today’s world, that
possibility is no dormant hypothetical. It is an increasingly prevalent state
of affairs.12
In short, although existing commentary has focused—understandably—
on the pitfalls of the third-party doctrine, the problem actually looms
considerably larger. Smith and Miller stand for the proposition that when
information is shared between parties with no preexisting trust relationship,
the act of sharing carries no expectation of privacy. Many commentators
have lodged their disagreement with this proposition. There is an important
sense, however, in which the proposition is not just wrong; it is backward.
When information is shared between parties with no preexisting trust
relationship, it makes little sense to speak of trust being misplaced, because
trust was not “placed” at all. The act of sharing therefore should carry even
more protection than the misplaced trust rule would afford. In this sense,
the abrogation of Smith and Miller—though certainly a welcome
possibility—would not go far enough. To refurbish Fourth Amendment law
for the digital age, it is not merely the third-party doctrine, but also the
misplaced trust rule, that needs rethinking.
32 (D.D.C. 2013) (describing the surveillance ushered in by section 215 of the PATRIOT
ACT as “so different from [the] simple pen register [in] Smith” and holding that “bulk
telephony metadata collection and analysis [violates] a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
But see ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated on other
grounds, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding, under Smith, that individuals do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephony metadata). On the scholarly front, see Laura
Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 865–71 (2014) (arguing that on the facts of Smith, reasonable
suspicion—at the very least—was essentially established, setting the case entirely apart from
applications today that extend its holding to bulk, suspicionless surveillance); Stephen E.
Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information,
Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (2007); Stephen E.
Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 39, 40 (2011) [hereinafter Henderson, Timely Demise] (describing the doctrine
as, among other things, “fundamentally misguided”); Neil M. Richards, The Information
Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1117–19 (2006); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of
Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 109–15 (2008); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the
Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV.
614, 619–21 (2011) (suggesting that technological change has rendered the third-party
doctrine untenable). Although some of these critiques preexisted the digital age,
technological change has only intensified their force. See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Automation
and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 585 (2011) (noting that although “Smith
and the Third-Party Doctrine were heavily criticized even before the Internet age, the
drumbeat of criticism has [only] intensified”); id. at 585 n.26 (compiling further sources).
See generally Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search?: Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002).
12. See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
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Against this backdrop, I propose a simple remedy: Fourth Amendment
doctrine must abandon the pretense that all private actors are alike. The
implication of A’s decision to share information with B should not be
uniform across contexts. Rather, it should depend on what type of “third
party” B is, on B’s role in the world vis-à-vis A. In many settings, it is
perfectly acceptable—indeed, it serves an important public function—for B
to help investigate A’s illicit activity. But there is also an important class of
cases in which B is not a run-of-the-mill private actor, but rather an
information fiduciary, beholden to A’s interests first and foremost.
I. THE DOCTRINAL STORY
When it comes to shared information, the familiar story is that Fourth
Amendment doctrine toggles between two rules. First, some acts of
disclosure simply extinguish one’s expectation of privacy outright. I call
this the “exposure” rule. If information has been exposed to the world, its
investigation does not qualify, in the first instance, as a search, so the
Fourth Amendment does not apply. Second, other acts of disclosure,
although they do not eliminate one’s expectation of privacy, do cause one to
run the risk that another party—the counterparty to the disclosure—will
betray the information to law enforcement. I refer to the latter as the
“misplaced trust” rule.13

Rule

Exposure
(no protection)
Misplaced Trust
(default)

By disclosing
information to B, has
A lost his expectation
of privacy?

By disclosing
information to B, has
A run the risk that B
will relay the
information to law
enforcement?

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

13. There is one set of cases that is not easily explained by this scheme—cases in which
the Court holds that no expectation of privacy exists in the specific type of evidence being
searched for, even if the evidence has not been, in the usual sense, “exposed.” The two
examples that come to mind are dog sniffs and sting operations designed to uncover illicit
activity in the home. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (explaining
that dog sniffs are “sui generis,” insofar as they precisely target contraband); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (“[W]hen, as here, the home is converted into a commercial
center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that
business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car,
or on the street.”). Because these cases are difficult to rationalize under any theory of
privacy, I do not take it as a particularly bad sign that they clash with the scheme set forth
here.
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But the familiar story is incomplete. In fact, there is a third Fourth
Amendment rule—a heightened tier of protection. Some acts of disclosure
neither extinguish one’s expectation of privacy in the shared information
nor cause one to run the risk of a counterparty betraying the information to
law enforcement. I refer to this as the “fiduciary” rule.

Rule

Exposure
(no protection)
Misplaced Trust
(default)
Fiduciary
(more protective)

By disclosing
information to B, has
A lost his expectation
of privacy?

By disclosing
information to B, has
A run the risk that B
will relay the
information to law
enforcement?

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

To date, the fiduciary rule has surfaced in the Court’s jurisprudence in
two settings: medical care and hotels. In both settings, the same impetus is
discernible—the misplaced trust rule seemed mismatched to the underlying
relationship. It seemed wrong to the Court—for good reason—that
constitutional privacy would be left to the mercy of doctors and hotel staff.
The rest of this part explores each rule, and their interrelationship, at greater
length.
A. Exposure
Exposure cases typically focus on the vantage point from which
information can be ascertained. As the Court explained in the seminal case
of Katz v. United States,14 “What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”15 This principle, repeated tirelessly since Katz,16 supplies an
intuitive anchor for Fourth Amendment doctrine. At root, the principle
depends on the uncontroversial premise that information disclosed to the
whole world carries no expectation of privacy—from which it follows that
the act of viewing and recording such information does not qualify as a
search.17

14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Id. at 351.
16. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
17. Sherry Colb has traced the contours of this logic (and its shortcomings) with
precision. See generally Colb, supra note 11.
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The key question, of course, is what counts as exposing something “to
the public.” In response, the Court has offered an elaborate, if sometimes
unconvincing, parade of answers. To begin with, something is exposed to
the public if it is viewable from a public place.18 Suppose Mary runs
frantically through the town square, yelling about the details of a murder
she recently committed. If a police officer, overhearing Mary, acts on the
information (decides to follow Mary, to arrest Mary, and so on), plainly no
search has occurred. The Fourth Amendment does not constrain the
officer’s ability to listen, from a public vantage point, to Mary’s ravings.
The same reasoning applies, moreover, if Mary is raving inside her home,
but loudly enough that she can be heard from the sidewalk;19 likewise, if
Mary posts the ravings to her Facebook page (assuming it is a public
page);20 or if she transcribes the ravings in a notebook and then discards the
notebook in a trash heap by the side of the road.21
What is true of a confession is also true of material evidence. Joe struts
through the town square with a kilo of cocaine under his arm, and a police
officer, viewing the drugs, arrests him. Clearly, no search has occurred.
Nor would it have been a search for the police officer to watch Joe, in
public, for many hours before Joe came into possession of the cocaine.
Indeed, it doesn’t matter how long the public surveillance of Joe had been
ongoing; absent certain kinds of technological enhancement, the
surveillance would never amount to a search.22 Similarly, if Joe puts a kilo
of cocaine on his coffee table and the table is viewable from the street, Joe
cannot complain if police officers look through his window, see the drugs,
and arrest him. Likewise, if Joe lives on a grand estate and the police enter
the grounds—against Joe’s wishes—and observe a kilo of cocaine on Joe’s
living room table while standing in the “fields” surrounding his home, no
search has occurred.23 Nor can Joe complain if he puts the kilo of cocaine
in his backyard and the police identify it via aerial surveillance.24
18. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001) (explaining that
“ordinary visual surveillance of a home”—from a public vantage point—is not a Fourth
Amendment search).
19. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013) (“[L]aw enforcement officers
need not ‘shield their eyes’ when passing by the home ‘on public thoroughfares.’” (quoting
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213)).
20. See, e.g., Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (N.D. Ga.
2013) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in material posted to a social networking
website); United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same). For an
excellent summary of the intersection of Fourth Amendment doctrine and social media, see
Stephen E. Henderson, Expectations of Privacy in Social Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 227
(2012).
21. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1986).
22. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34 (explaining that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that
the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology,” and holding that doctrine must evolve to reflect
this reality). Something like this is rather obviously at stake in the Court’s recent holdings
regarding GPS and smart phones. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
23. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984).
24. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207.
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The same logic applies to the tracking of movements through public
space—a mainstay of everyday law enforcement. Suppose the police
suspect Bill of drug trafficking, so they watch Bill’s movements to and
from work every day, noting his stops. After a few weeks, the police patch
together a pattern of Bill stopping at a known drug den after work, and on
that basis, they secure a warrant to search his apartment. Bill would have
no grounds to complain about such surveillance; he has no expectation of
privacy in his public movements. Nor would Bill have any grounds to
complain about the police tailing his movements by car, even if they do so
by getting Bill to unwittingly equip his car with a tracking device.25 To
whatever extent technological enhancement would change these
outcomes—a doctrinal question currently in flux, being negotiated against
the backdrop of United States v. Jones26—it is clear that in the absence of
technological enhancement, no Fourth Amendment claim would lie.
Some of these holdings may seem like unsound applications of the
“exposure” principle. Who, after all, would think that activity carried out in
a private backyard, shielded from neighbors by a tall fence, is exposed to
the whole world simply because someone could, in theory, view it from the
sky? And who would think the police, having entered private property in
clear disregard of a “no trespassing” sign, have free reign to snoop around,
as long as they stay sufficiently far away from the physical perimeter of
one’s home? The important point, however, is that even putting the virtues
of these holdings to one side, their analytic underpinning is clear. The
Court’s logic focuses on whether the relevant information has been
“exposed” to the world. When the answer is yes, no Fourth Amendment
protection applies because the observational act does not amount, in the
first instance, to a search.
Before moving on, there is a final pair of cases that qualify—rhetorically,
at least—as applications of the exposure rule: Smith and Miller, which hold
that sharing a dialed number with a phone company or sharing financial
information with a bank eliminates one’s expectation of privacy in the
relevant information.27 To reach this result, Smith and Miller conflate the
act of disclosing information with the act of exposing information to public
view, a conceptual jump that scholars and sitting judges have long
maligned.28 This is understandable—in the pantheon of modern Fourth
25. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983).
26. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
27. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) (sharing a dialed number); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976) (sharing financial information); see also United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980) (interpreting Miller to preclude defendant from
challenging the search of his accountant’s papers, on the grounds that, inter alia, the search
yielded only financial information).
28. In addition to criticizing the Court’s conflation of disclosure and exposure as a
normative proposition, various commentators have also noted that, in practice, the Court has
not had the courage of its own conviction. Like many extreme principles, the third-party
doctrine would lead to some very uncomfortable results if extended to its logical limit.
Instead of biting the bullet, the Court has continually found ways around applying the thirdparty doctrine in its strong form. See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v.
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Amendment law, Smith and Miller are the only times the Court has
understood the disclosure of information to a specific counterparty as
equivalent to broadcasting the information to the whole world.29
B. Misplaced Trust
This brings us to the second rule. Notwithstanding the Court’s rather
zealous language from Smith and Miller, it simply is not the case that
“individual[s] ha[ve] no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”30 In fact, the default rule—famously
enshrined in Katz, when the Court banned warrantless wiretapping—is just
the opposite. Normally, when A shares information with B, A does retain
her expectation of privacy in the information.31 But A also runs the risk that
B, now in possession of the information, will betray it to law enforcement.
This is the sense in which, as the Court is fond of repeating, the Fourth
Amendment is not a bulwark against misplaced trust; it provides no remedy

Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431, 438
(2013) (arguing that, in the last twenty-five years, “there have certainly been cases which
some of the Justices believed to be governed by the [third-party] doctrine,” but “the doctrine
has not fared well”); id. at 438–43 (exploring how the Court has departed from the thirdparty doctrine in no fewer than five prominent cases); cf. Strandburg, supra note 11, at 633–
38 (arguing that, notwithstanding the sweeping language of Smith and Miller, the
“aggressive” form of the third-party doctrine has almost never been faithfully applied).
29. This claim requires two caveats. First, the Supreme Court has held that some Fourth
Amendment challenges are stillborn for want of “standing,” because the police did not
search the defendant’s property; rather, the police searched another person’s property, and
that search ended up yielding evidence incriminating the defendant. See, e.g., Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980) (holding that defendant lacked standing to challenge
the search of a third-party’s handbag). One could read these “Fourth Amendment standing”
cases as standing for the proposition that transmitting certain types of material evidence to a
third-party—for example, as in Rawlings, a bag of drugs for storage in a third-party’s
purse—is equivalent to exposing evidence to the whole world. But even so, the Fourth
Amendment standing cases apply only to material evidence, not shared information. See
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (stating that passengers lacked standing to challenge
the search of a car when they had no possessory interest in either the car or the evidence
seized from the car); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (finding defendant lacked
standing to challenge the search of a home where he was working as a drug packager).
Second, some lower courts have picked up where the Supreme Court left off in Smith and
Miller and extended the reach of the third-party doctrine. See, e.g., United States v.
Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 361 (D. Vt. 2013) (holding that cell phone users have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-site location data). However, Smith and Miller (and
Payner, insofar as it echoes Miller) are the only times the Supreme Court has spoken on the
issue.
30. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (summarizing the received view
of Smith and Miller); see Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (“This Court consistently has held that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.”).
31. Traditionally, the wedge dividing Smith from Katz—or, one could say, keeping
Smith quarantined—is the distinction between “content” and “noncontent” information. The
pitfalls of this distinction, particularly in an age of sophisticated data analytics, are well
known. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. Similarly well known is Orin Kerr’s
defense of the distinction on technological neutrality grounds. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for
the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 581 (2009).
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for “a wrongdoer’s [mistaken] belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”32
Mail correspondence is the paradigm case. In one of its earliest Fourth
Amendment holdings, Ex Parte Jackson,33 the Court canonically held that
the government may not engage in suspicionless searches of private letters
because “[l]etters and sealed packages . . . are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection” when sent through the postal service “as if
they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own
domiciles.”34 In some sense, Katz and its progeny are, at their core, little
more than an affirmative extrapolation of the principle in Ex Parte Jackson.
The essence of Katz (and Ex Parte Jackson) is twofold. First, one’s
expectation of privacy in the contents of a phone call—or, equally, a letter
or an email—survive disclosure. Otherwise, corresponding with another
person would amount to an ipso facto waiver of all restraints on law
enforcement surveillance of private communication. At the same time,
however, corresponding with another person does expose one to the risk of
betrayal. No one would construe Ex Parte Jackson—and as far as I know,
no one has construed Ex Parte Jackson—to limit the ability of a letter’s
recipient to forward its contents to law enforcement, just as no one
construes Katz to limit the ability of the person on the other line from
recording the call or consenting to a wiretap.35
Framing the issue this way underscores the analytic harmony between
Katz and the confidential informant (CI) cases, which hold that A, by
sharing information with B, runs the risk that B is an undercover police
agent.36 Although Katz is often described as the “lodestar” of Fourth
Amendment protection37 while the CI cases are described as the opposite,38
a common premise unites them. Namely, by disclosing something to B, A
puts herself at B’s mercy, exposed to the danger that B may prove to be a
“false friend.”39 Even for commentators that decry the CI cases as wrongly
decided—and there are plenty40—this premise is not in dispute. For critics,
32. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
33. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
34. Id. at 733.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 726 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“[T]wo people who speak face to face in a private place or on a private telephone line both
may share an expectation that the conversation will remain private, but either may give
effective consent to a wiretap or other electronic surveillance. One might say that the
telephone line, or simply the space that separates two persons in conversation, is their jointly
owned ‘container.’ Each has standing to challenge the use as evidence of the fruits of an
unauthorized search of that ‘container,’ but either may also give effective consent to the
search.” (citations omitted)).
36. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293; Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
37. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
38. See supra note 11.
39. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of
Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253 (2006).
40. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 103–06 (1991); James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy’s Sake: Toward
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the point is simply that the danger of B turning out to be a “false friend”
does not entail the danger that B already is a “false friend.”41 But
controversy about the second proposition in no way disturbs the first.
Among scholars who would do away with the CI cases, none would do
away with “false friend” logic as such—which makes sense because, at
some level, the “false friend” logic simply restates the misplaced trust rule.
Finally, the misplaced trust rule also applies to spaces, including
homes.42 By inviting someone into my home, I don’t lose my expectation
of privacy; I still have the right to exclude law enforcement from entry
(absent a warrant or probable cause). But I do run the risk that an invited
guest—or, likewise, a roommate, spouse, or family member—will open my
home to law enforcement. This is true in two senses. First, I run the risk
that another person will locate incriminating evidence in my home,
physically remove it, and pass it on to the police.43 Suppose Laura’s
boyfriend finds cocaine under their mattress and takes it to the local
precinct, leading to her arrest. On these facts, Laura has no constitutional
recourse.44 The second sense in which the misplaced trust rule applies to
homes is that if A and B cohabitate, A runs the risk of B consenting to
search by law enforcement (and vice versa). In United States v. Matlock,45
the Court established, in no uncertain terms, that one cotenant may consent
to a search on behalf of all cotenants, even if there is evidence that another

an Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 728
(1985).
41. In this sense, to bear their conceptual burden, critics of the CI cases must distinguish
between (1) B receiving information from A, and then deciding to tell law enforcement, and
(2) B deciding, in the first instance, that she wishes to incriminate A and then eliciting
information from A with the goal of assisting law enforcement. Although this distinction is
certainly conceivable, it also gives rise to a rather serious line-drawing problem. In practice,
there are many sympathetic cases—cases where I suspect most people would want B to
remain free to assist the police without constitutional hindrance—where B will make up her
mind to betray A before soliciting the incriminating information or material evidence. For
example, what if A is B’s abusive spouse, and B, fearing for her own safety, decides to build
a case against A? To be persuasive, criticism of the CI cases must distinguish a hypothetical
like this from the use of police informants—a taller order than it might first appear.
42. That being said, the application of the misplaced trust rule to spaces is not limited to
homes. Given the hallowed status of the home in Fourth Amendment law, however, other
examples follow, as a normative matter, essentially a fortiori. See, e.g., O’Conner v. Ortega,
480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (holding that employees have an expectation of privacy in their
offices, but that “in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and
other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related
visits,” which carries certain risks).
43. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487–89 (1971) (holding that it was a
private search—outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment—when a woman retrieved
incriminating evidence about her husband from their home and gave the evidence to the
police); see also United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 525–27 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
it was a purely private search when defendant’s roommate and her boyfriend entered
defendant’s room, removed a photo album, and gave it to the police).
44. Indeed, if Laura peruses the case law, she may be chastened to learn that courts
express sympathy not for the party in her position, but for the party in her boyfriend’s
position—the innocent figure who brings wrongdoing to light. See Bowers, 594 F.3d at 525–
27.
45. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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cotenant, absent when the police arrived on the scene, would have objected
to the search.46 Later cases have affirmed this principle numerous times
over.47
C. Expanding the Horizon of Protection
And so the traditional story ends, with the idea that another private
actor’s decision to cooperate with law enforcement is, across contexts, the
outer bound of constitutional protection and that no matter how robustly the
Fourth Amendment might protect us from police activity, it protects us not
at all from the activity of private persons. Taking the Court’s words at face
value, one could be forgiven for seeing this idea as an irreducible axiom of
Fourth Amendment law. The reality is more complicated. The misplaced
trust rule certainly operates as a constitutional default. But ultimately, it is
only that. Like any default rule, it comes under strain in exceptional cases.
The question is what makes the exceptional cases exceptional. I believe the
answer centers on relationships.
1. Doctors
In 1988, doctors at a public hospital in Charleston, South Carolina,
instituted a program to screen the urine of pregnant women for drug use
and, if drug use was found, to transmit the incriminating samples to law
enforcement.48 One of the women subject to this program was Crystal
Ferguson. Along with a group of other similarly situated plaintiffs, she
brought a constitutional challenge on the grounds that the collection and
testing of the patients’ urine violated their Fourth Amendment rights.49 The
Court held, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,50 that it did because (1) the
hospital’s program involved suspicionless searches, and (2) unlike other
drug testing cases—where the Court had permitted suspicionless searches
because of the “special needs” they serve—law enforcement was the

46. See id. at 169–72.
47. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186–87 (1990) (extending Matlock to
situations where third party is not actually a cotenant and only has apparent shared authority
over the residence). Compare Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114–23 (2006) (holding
that if both cotenants are present, and one invokes his Fourth Amendment rights, that
invocation trumps the other’s consent), with Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137
(2014) (holding that the consent of cotenant sufficed to justify the search after the other
tenant (1) had invoked his Randolph rights, but (2) had been removed from the premises).
Furthermore, the same logic also works in reverse, as applied to guests themselves, rather
than people who invite guests into their homes. Just as A does not lose all expectation of
privacy in his home by inviting B over, so, too, B does not lose all expectation of privacy by
taking A’s invitation. Rather, both parties, A and B, risk “betrayal” (i.e., consent to search by
law enforcement or exposure of contraband) by the other. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990).
48. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70 (2001).
49. See id. at 72–73.
50. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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Thus, the program did not withstand Fourth
ultimate purpose.51
Amendment scrutiny.52
I regard Ferguson as unassailably correct. The interesting question is
why. The opinion for the Court sweeps past—but, curiously enough, never
fully answers—the threshold question in the case: Given the misplaced
trust rule, why does the Fourth Amendment even come into play? What
aspect of the doctors’ decision to betray their patients’ trust amounts to a
law enforcement “search”? The only explanation offered in Justice
Stevens’s opinion is that “[b]ecause [the South Carolina hospital] is a state
hospital, the members of its staff are government actors, subject to the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”53 And this explanation has some
glancing appeal. After all, the Fourth Amendment certainly embeds some
version of the state action requirement; as a general matter, “private
searches” meet with no constitutional scrutiny, even if the very same
activity, carried out by law enforcement, would undeniably constitute a
search.54
But the majority’s “state hospital” rationale suffers a fundamental defect.
Government actors are only “subject to the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment,” in the way the majority suggests, to the extent their actions
are coercive, either because the search in question is compelled by law or
because failure to submit to the search incurs legal consequences. This is
true of all the special needs cases invoked by Justice Stevens to support the
“state hospital” rationale.55 For example, in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Ass’n,56 train conductors brought a Fourth Amendment
challenge to a federal statute requiring drug testing for railway employees.57
It was undisputed (and indisputable) that the testing constituted a search;58
it was mandatory,59 and it was plainly an invasion of privacy. The question
51. Id. at 84.
52. Id. at 84–85.
53. Id. at 76.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (declaring that the
Fourth Amendment is “wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable
one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the
participation or knowledge of any governmental official’” (quoting Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
55. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76; see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309–10 (1997)
(urine test required as a condition of running for public office); Verona Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648–49 (1995) (student urine testing required by school district); Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 659–63 (1989) (urine testing as a
condition of employment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335–37 (1985) (search of
student’s effects required by schools officials).
56. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). For background on the way the Court reasons through
mandatory urine testing—and other mandatory “special needs” searches—see Chandler, 520
U.S. 305.
57. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612.
58. See id. at 618.
59. This is true even in the case of the noncompulsory drug testing, which the Court held
to be a constructive law enforcement search. Id. at 615–16. Although Skinner concerned
both mandatory and “optional” drug testing on the part of private companies, the Court
explicitly rejected the proposition that the searches were not instigated by the government.
Id. at 614–15. In other words, it saw the testing as coerced by the state de facto rather than
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before the Court was whether the “special need” of public safety—in light
of the heightened danger that arises from having railway conductors
operating trains under the influence of drugs—justified the invasion of
privacy.60 (And the answer was yes.61)
In Ferguson, by contrast, the initial act of disclosure—from patient to
doctor—was not mandatory.62 To be sure, because the disclosure was
motivated by a desire for medical care, it would be difficult to call the act
purely voluntary. The patients needed prenatal care, and to obtain it, urine
testing was necessary. What were the patients to do? Presumably none of
them anticipated (or desired) the transmission of incriminating medical
evidence to law enforcement.63 But the fact remains that no law required
the patients to entrust urine to their doctors. They chose to do so—and their
trust ended up being misplaced. Under existing doctrine, that should be the
end of the matter.
To be clear, I regard this result as an argument against the misplaced
trust rule—hence the motivation for this Article. But there can be little
doubt that on a faithful application of the rule, a patient’s decision to give
her doctor a urine sample should end the inquiry. The doctor should be
free—as any party is free—to transmit incriminating evidence to law
enforcement.64 A patient no more can object, on Fourth Amendment
grounds, to a doctor furnishing law enforcement with a urine sample than I
can object to my sister furnishing law enforcement with information about a
crime I committed, in the event that I (mistakenly) confess the details to
her. For purposes of the misplaced trust rule, what matters is not whether
the entrusted party is a state actor or a private actor; what matters is that
de jure—but the subtleties of this distinction are beside the point, because in Ferguson, the
testing was not coerced by the state in either sense. If it was coerced, it was so by the
doctors, which might be said, of course, to underscore a problem with the private search
doctrine. But it does not make Ferguson and Skinner analogous.
60. Id. at 618–20.
61. Id. at 621.
62. As it turns out, even if the initial disclosure was not voluntary—as the Fourth Circuit
concluded on remand—this still cannot rescue the majority’s logic. See Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 402–03 (4th Cir. 2002) (explaining the difficulties associated with
treating disclosures to doctors as “voluntary”). What makes it a search is its practical
involuntariness—an idea I explore in Part II below—not the fact that the counterparty to the
(practically involuntary) transmission was a public actor. Put otherwise, it would be just as
practically involuntary, and therefore just as much a search, if the doctors were private
doctors.
63. In this respect, the Fourth Circuit’s opinion on remand confirms what common sense
makes inescapable: the patients were not consenting to a law enforcement search when they
turned over their urine for medical purposes. See id.
64. To be clear, I mean that doctors “should be free” to transmit incriminating evidence
to law enforcement under the logic of the private search rule, not that doctors ought to be
free, in a normative sense, to transmit incriminating evidence to law enforcement. In fact, in
many jurisdictions doctors have obligations of confidentiality that strictly limit what they can
do with patient information. See, e.g., Alsip v. Johnson City Med. Ctr., 197 S.W.3d 722,
725–28 (Tenn. 2006) (explaining doctors’ confidentiality obligations under Tennessee law
and canvassing other jurisdictions with equivalent rules). This is rightly so: expectations of
confidence are what facilitate candid interaction with doctors and, ultimately, what allow for
optimal medical care.
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information has been entrusted voluntarily. Once voluntary entrustment
occurs, the entrusting party (here, the patient) runs the risk of betrayal by
the entrusted party (here, the doctor)—whether or not the entrusted party is
a state actor.
An example will shore up the point. Suppose a drug dealer is waiting in
line at the DMV with a paper bag full of illicit pills in his coat pocket.
After receiving a call from a customer who lives across the street, the drug
dealer gets an idea. He thinks: I bet I could run across the street and make
this delivery before my number is called. Then the drug dealer gets another
idea: he will only take a few pills across the street, in case the deal is a
setup. So he reaches into the bag, puts some pills in his pocket, and asks
the person sitting next to him—another private citizen, for all he knows—to
watch the paper bag for him. The neighbor agrees, and the drug dealer goes
across the street to make his delivery.
In this example, if the neighbor becomes suspicious and rustles through
the bag to discover the pills, there is no dispute that he could turn the pills
over to law enforcement (and provide testimony about the incident) without
violating—indeed, without even triggering—the drug dealer’s Fourth
Amendment rights. By leaving the bag with his neighbor, not only has the
drug dealer run the risk that the neighbor will become curious and decide to
betray his trust, but, under Hoffa v. United States65 and United States v.
White,66 he has also run the risk that the neighbor is already working as an
informant. Indeed, he has even run the risk that (unbeknownst to the drug
dealer) the police have orchestrated the entire scene to catch him redhanded when he hands over the bag. All of this would fall clearly within
the bounds of Fourth Amendment law.
But now adjust the hypothetical slightly: instead of giving the bag to his
neighbor, the drug dealer goes up to the DMV counter and asks a clerk to
hold on to the bag. The clerk agrees. Does this version of the hypothetical
yield a different result because the DMV clerk, unlike the neighbor, is a
state actor? Does the Fourth Amendment prohibit the clerk from helping
law enforcement in a manner that it does not prohibit the neighbor from
doing so? Or, asked the other way around, has the drug dealer run any less
risk of misplaced trust simply because the clerk happens to work for the
state? Hewing to its own logic, the Ferguson majority would have to
answer all these questions “yes.” But that seems amiss. Under existing
doctrine, the important variable is the fact of entrustment, not the identity of
the entrusted party. If entrustment occurred, the Fourth Amendment has
nothing to say when it proves ill-advised, whether or not the entrusted party
is a state actor.67
65. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
66. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
67. It may be that if the entrusted party happens to be a police officer, the analysis would
proceed differently. Query: If a drug dealer walks into a police station and leaves a bag of
drugs in the care of the supervising officer, does the Fourth Amendment constrain the
officer’s ability to open the bag? Perhaps. But even so, what is at stake is not the publicprivate divide as such; it is the distinction between law enforcement and all other actors,
public or private. The reasoning in Ferguson still falters.
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Ultimately, then, the rationale offered by the Ferguson majority to justify
subjecting the urine screening program to constitutional scrutiny—that the
conduct occurred “[at] a state hospital”68—cannot shoulder its doctrinal
burden. Why, given the misplaced trust rule, should the transmission of
incriminating evidence from doctors to law enforcement qualify as a search
at all, regardless of the “special need” behind it? The opinion for the Court
begs this question in lieu of resolving it,69 which is no doubt why Justice
Scalia, dissenting in Ferguson, expressed such virulent dismay with Justice
Stevens and the majority. In Justice Scalia’s words:
Until today, we have never held—or even suggested—that material which
a person voluntarily entrusts to someone else cannot be given by that
person to the police, and used for whatever evidence it may contain.
Without so much as discussing the point, the Court today opens a hole in
our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.70

Justice Scalia is right.71 Normally, once A shares incriminating evidence
with B, A can raise no objection if B decides to share the evidence with law
enforcement.72 Ferguson departs from this principle. And in doing so, it

68. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001).
69. Not surprisingly, this has been replicated in lower court applications of Ferguson.
See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 2005) (“We thus read . . . Ferguson
to call for the application of the special-needs test in cases involving suspicionless
searches . . . .” (emphasis added)); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Ferguson . . . struck down suspicionless searches because they vindicated no special need
distinguishable from general law enforcement.”). Indeed, I was able to locate only one
dissent in one case—combing through all of the federal appellate jurisprudence—that
indicates an appreciation for Ferguson’s more radical implications. See Kerns v. Bader, 663
F.3d 1173, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 2011) (Holloway, J., dissenting) (arguing that Ferguson not
only vindicates patients’ expectations of privacy in personal medical evidence but also
reaffirms the “long ago established” proposition that “the police cannot breach one’s
constitutional rights simply by asking another person to do it for them”—that doctors may
not furnish the police with material that the police, absent probable cause, couldn’t seize on
their own).
70. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. Well, to be picky about it, Scalia’s use of the word “never,” though technically true,
is a bit misleading. He is right that no other Supreme Court case supports the proposition
that material evidence voluntarily given to a third party cannot be shared subsequently with
law enforcement. But zoom out one click—make the point about incriminating evidence in
general, not material evidence in particular—and the hotel cases discussed below are similar
to Ferguson. See infra Part I.C.2.
72. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 749 (1971) (“[H]owever strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his
expectations in this respect are not protected by the Fourth Amendment when it turns out
that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authorities.”);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment [does not
protect] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his
wrongdoing will not reveal it.”). As Justice Scalia (correctly) notes, “The Hoffa line of
cases . . . does not distinguish between operations meant to catch a criminal in the act, and
those meant only to gather evidence of prior wrongdoing,” as was the case in Ferguson, 532
U.S. at 94 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a deft elaboration of this point, see Colb, supra note
11, at 182 (validating Scalia’s analytic point the same way I am validating it here—by noting
the sense in which Ferguson departs from the premise that “police collection of what has
been surrendered to a third party . . . is not a Fourth Amendment search”); id. at 181–84
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runs contrary to what is often described, in other cases, as an immutable
first principle of Fourth Amendment law.73
Much as I agree, however, with Justice Scalia’s analytic point, I cannot
sign on to his conclusion that no search occurred. The normative intuition
underlying the majority opinion in Ferguson seems to me undeniably
right—so right, in fact, that it verges on self-evident, which may help to
explain why Justice Stevens felt no compulsion to fully defend his
rationale. Doctors should not be allowed to betray the trust of their patients.
Full stop. Which is to say, something about the nature of the relationship
between doctors and patients creates an exception to the misplaced trust
rule. Under normal circumstances, if A shares evidence with B, B is free to
relay the evidence to law enforcement. But if B is a doctor, the misplaced
trust rule no longer applies.
Because the Ferguson majority was able to wave off this problem by
invoking the public status of the hospital, it made no effort to reconcile its
holding with other instantiations of the misplaced trust rule. The CI cases
make one, and only one, appearance in Ferguson—in Justice Scalia’s
dissent.74 But make no mistake: Ferguson runs directly into this line of
cases.75 At some level, in fact, it runs into Katz itself. For if the logic of
(exploring the radical effect that Ferguson’s logic, extended to its limits, has for Fourth
Amendment privacy).
73. Although the majority tries to parry this argument, its reasoning withers under
scrutiny. According to the majority,
The dissent . . . mischaracterizes our opinion as holding that “material which a
person voluntarily entrusts to someone else cannot be given by that person to the
police, and used for whatever evidence it may contain.” But, as we have noted
elsewhere, given the posture of the case, we must assume for purposes of decision
that the patients did not consent to the searches, and we leave the question of
consent for the Court of Appeals to determine.
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 n.24 (citation omitted). This rejoinder is confused. It conflates
consent to search by law enforcement with the entirely distinct question of whether the initial
transmission of evidence—to a party other than law enforcement—was consensual. The
Ferguson majority is correct that its opinion makes no pronouncement, one way or the other,
on the first question. Justice Scalia’s point, however, is not that the patients consented to
search by law enforcement (though, of course, he may also believe that). His point is that
the patients consensually gave urine samples to their doctors, which means—according to
Scalia—that the patients assumed the risk that the doctors would betray their trust. If so,
they can raise no Fourth Amendment grievance, not because they “consented to the
searches,” as the majority claims, but because no search occurred.
By analogy, the difference here is between (1) telling a police officer, “You may
search my car,” which results in the officer finding a bag of cocaine, and (2) having a
mechanic stumble on a bag of cocaine in your car, which he takes and gives to the police. In
the first example, you consented to search—a search occurred, but it was justified. In the
second example, no search occurred. As long as the mechanic is not an agent of law
enforcement, he may dispose of the incriminating evidence as he sees fit—the Fourth
Amendment does not even enter the equation.
74. See id. at 94–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. That Ferguson did not formally reach the “search” question is sometimes invoked to
explain the case away. These efforts find themselves in the analytically unfortunate position
of citing the fact that Ferguson does not address the threshold search issue as evidence that a
search did not occur. This is manifestly backward. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for
an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR 14-01, 2014 WL 5463097, at *7
n.9 (FISA Ct. Mar. 20, 2014).
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Ferguson applied to phone calls, the result would be that not only are police
prohibited from tapping phones, but also that the party on the other line—
the party in the position analogous to a doctor—is prohibited from
disclosing the contents of the call to the police. But that, of course, is not
the constitutional rule we have; nor, for reasons explained more fully
below, is it the constitutional rule we want.
Ultimately, the point is not that Ferguson upends Katz. On the contrary,
Ferguson and Katz coexist—and should continue to coexist—happily. The
point is that their coexistence lodges a challenge to the familiar doctrinal
story. Either (1) Ferguson is wrongly decided, or (2) the axiom that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect misplaced trust is, in fact, no axiom at
all—it is simply a default rule, subject to exceptions. And one of those
exceptions is the doctor-patient relationship.
2. Hotels
Now for the second exception—hotels. In two cases, the Court has held
definitively that hotel managers may not grant police access to a guest’s
premises, even if the hotel manager himself has permission to enter those
premises.76 The first case is United States v. Jeffers.77 There, police
acquired a key to a hotel guest’s room from the assistant manager and
proceeded to enter the room without obtaining consent from anyone; neither
the defendant nor his aunt (who was renting the room and with whom the
defendant was staying at the time) was present when the police entered.78
Inside the room, the police found a bevy of narcotics evidence.79 When the
search was challenged, the Government conceded that their actions were
unlawful as against the defendant’s aunt.80 But the Government argued,
nevertheless, that its actions were not unlawful as to the defendant because
76. There is a third case in this constellation, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961), presenting the identical issue except with regard to a landlord, not a hotel manager.
Because hotel managers offer a closer analogy to doctors—and because, for the purposes of
constitutional privacy, what is true of a temporary residence like a hotel room is surely true,
a fortiori, of a permanent residence like an apartment—I will summarize Chapman only
briefly here. The police obtained permission from a tenant’s landlord to enter the tenant’s
apartment. Id. at 612. When the tenant moved to suppress evidence procured during the
apartment’s search, the Government argued that the landlord had consented to it, effectively
waiving the tenant’s Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 616.
The Court rejected this argument, citing two rationales. First, the Court could find
no case under the property laws and landlord-tenant laws of the relevant jurisdiction (in this
case, Georgia) authorizing landlords to enter a tenant’s premises merely because they
suspect that criminal activity might be going on. Id. What a landlord was not authorized to
do himself, the Court reasoned, surely he could not authorize another person to do. Id.
Second, the Court concluded that in fashioning the “procedural protections accorded
to those charged with crime,” constitutional law “ought not to bow” to “the body of private
property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical.” Id. at 617 (quoting Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 266–67 (1960)).
77. 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
78. Id. at 50.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 51.
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he was not the one formally renting the room.81 The Court disagreed. It
reasoned that what was unlawful (by the Government’s own admission) as
applied to one occupant was also unlawful as applied to the other,82 so the
evidence was tossed.83
The second case—a more lucrative doctrinal resource—is Stoner v.
California.84 There, as in Jeffers, police obtained consent (and a key) from
a hotel manager to search an occupant’s room, where they located evidence
of criminal activity.85 The question presented was whether, as in Jeffers, it
was unconstitutional for the police to enter the defendant’s hotel room
simply on the basis of another party’s consent.86 The Court agreed,
describing the constitutional right in question as one that
only the petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through
an agent . . . [and] there is nothing in the record to indicate that the police
had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been
authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search [his] room.87

In other words, the defendant’s acquiescence to the hotel’s policy requiring
him to “place[] [his key] in the mail box each time [he] left the hotel”88—
thereby exposing potentially sensitive information to the hotel staff—did
not expose him to the risk of the staff’s cooperation with law enforcement.
It may seem odd to invoke these cases alongside Ferguson. Where the
latter seems to pick out a socially distinctive relationship for elevated
protection, the hotel cases—one might argue—achieve nothing so
luminous; they seem like humdrum applications of agency law, transplanted
to the Fourth Amendment setting. By granting someone else access to your
temporary dwelling space, you do not necessarily run the risk that he, in
turn, will grant someone else access to that space. What great triumph is
there in that?
There are two responses to this question, and they interpenetrate. The
first response is that the “agency principles” on exhibit in Jeffers and Stoner
are not as humdrum as initial appearances might imply. After all, the Court
sees the agency question quite differently when it is not a hotel manager,
but instead a cotenant or a guest, who authorizes the police to enter a
residence. In United States v. Matlock, the Court made clear that when
someone with shared authority over the premises invites the police in, no
Fourth Amendment violation occurs.89 And in Illinois v. Rodriguez,90 the
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 52–53.
83. Id. at 54.
84. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
85. Id. at 485–86.
86. Id. at 484.
87. Id. at 489.
88. Id. at 485.
89. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 168–69 (1974) (finding consent by cotenant
to enter apartment justified law enforcement search). Compare Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (holding that if both cotenants are present, and one invokes his Fourth
Amendment rights, that invocation trumps the other’s consent), with Fernandez v. California,
134 S. Ct. 1126, 1130 (2014) (holding that consent of cotenant sufficed to justify search after
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Court extended this core principle—and outcome—to situations where
someone only appears to have shared authority.91 Whether someone else’s
authority over my premises is actual or merely apparent, I run the risk that
he or she will consent to entry by law enforcement.
The scope of the latter principle bears emphasizing. In light of the
“misplaced trust” principle, it is of little surprise that someone with actual
shared authority over premises may consent to entry by law enforcement.
For the reasons set forth above, space, like information, is something that
can be entrusted: if A invites B into her home, and all the more so if A
decides to cohabitate with B, A runs the risk of B betraying their residence
(so to speak) to the police.
But what about apparent authority? It is hard to see why the “misplaced
trust” principle would authorize someone with the mere appearance of
authority to consent to entry by law enforcement. No actual “entrustment”
occurred. So it strains plausibility to say that the tenant’s trust, which had
not been “placed” in the first instance, had been misplaced. Furthermore,
the “consent by apparent authority” rule is difficult to square with Stoner,
which—as the defendant in Rodriguez pointed out—explicitly held that “the
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded . . . by
unrealistic doctrines of ‘apparent authority.’”92
Appreciating this difficulty, Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rodriguez
addressed the case’s seeming tension with Stoner head on. In Justice
Scalia’s view, the Stoner opinion—with its high-flying rhetoric about
apparent authority—was ambiguous between two views.93 First, the Stoner
Court might have meant that it would always be unrealistic to let apparent
authority “erode” Fourth Amendment protection; it might have been
drawing a categorical line.94 Second, the Stoner Court might have been
saying that it was unrealistic, on the specific facts of Stoner, to conclude
that the hotel manager actually had apparent authority.95 Justice Scalia—
and a majority of the Court—favored the latter interpretation.
On the Rodriguez Court’s reading of Stoner, then, the latter stands for the
proposition that “the police could not rely upon the obtained consent
because they knew it came from a hotel clerk, knew that the room was
rented and exclusively occupied by the defendant, and could not reasonably
have believed that the [hotel manager] had general access to or control over
the [room].”96 In this light, even if Jeffers and Stoner are about applying
agency law principles to the Fourth Amendment setting, the way they do so
still sheds light on the conceptual architecture of constitutional privacy.
They underscore the importance of relationships, the difference between
the other tenant (1) had invoked his Randolph rights, but (2) had been removed from the
premises).
90. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
91. See id. at 186.
92. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488.
93. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 187–89.
94. See id. at 187.
95. See id. at 186–88.
96. Id. at 188.
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granting an intimate (a spouse, a friend, or a family member) access to
one’s private space, as opposed to granting a hotel manager the same.
But Jeffers and Stoner also invite a more expansive reading. Suppose
that, in Stoner, the hotel manager did not simply show the police to the door
and (literally) turn the key. Instead, when the police arrived, the hotel
manager said: “I’ll tell you what—how about, instead of having me let you
into the room, I’ll go in, see what I can find, and bring it out for you.”97
Would the result be different? One could, of course, argue that the police in
this hypothetical instigated the hotel manager’s activity, rendering him a de
facto agent of law enforcement and bringing the search back into the Fourth
Amendment’s sweep. But this route, in addition to straining existing case
law,98 also sells short the larger point. Namely, it seems odd, given the
Stoner Court’s clear determination that the hotel manager could not let the
police in, to conclude that the hotel manager would be permitted to simply
go in to the room and, say, empty all of its contents into the hall. Suppose,
for example, that the manager, having seen a report on the local news about
a recent robbery, took it upon himself to search through every hotel room
for evidence of the crime, and when the police arrive, the hotel manager
already has the incriminating evidence waiting for them. Would that be
permissible?
To be sure, there is no logical contradiction between (1) the idea that the
police may not enter a hotel room on consent of the hotel manager, and (2)
the idea that the hotel manager may enter a hotel room himself, and relay
whatever he finds there to law enforcement. The absence of a logical
contradiction is what makes the reading “expansive.” But the more
expansive reading also strikes me as the far more persuasive one—for it
seems quite implausible that Stoner would come down, ultimately, to the
way the hotel manager betrayed the confidence of his guest, as opposed to
the fact of betrayal.99
97. For fun, we can imagine even more fanciful versions of the hypothetical. Suppose
the hotel manager says, “I’m worried that if I let you into the room, whatever evidence you
find will ultimately be tossed. But I’ve read the Jacobsen case”—which, without a time
machine or great prescience, the hotel manager in Stoner could not have done; but the point
still stands—“so I know that if I perform the search, and I bring the evidence back out to
you, there’s no Fourth Amendment problem. So sit tight.”
98. See infra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.
99. See United States v. Spicer, 432 F. App’x 522 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
private search rule—allowing law enforcement to retrace the steps of private actors who
have already performed a search—does not apply to hotel rooms because they are, in
essence, residences); United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 720–21 (9th Cir. 2009) (drawing
on Stoner to hold that it was a Fourth Amendment violation when security personnel at a
hotel—private employees—engaged in a search of defendant’s hotel room, opened suitcases
to locate contraband, and gave the contraband to the police); see also Georgia v. Randolph,
547 U.S. 103, 112 (2006) (“[A] hotel manager calls up no customary understanding of
authority to admit guests without the consent of the current occupant . . . and a hotel guest
customarily has no reason to expect the manager to allow anyone but his own employees
into his room.”). But see United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1219–21 (9th Cir. 1981)
(finding no violation for hotel manager to turn over to law enforcement contraband that
defendant had abandoned in his room, despite the fact that defendant had instructed the hotel
manager to convey the contraband to his lawyer); State v. Weekley, 27 P.3d 325, 329–30
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding it was private action outside the Fourth Amendment’s
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In my view, Stoner vindicates the grander of these principles. It stands
for the proposition that hotel managers, because they are hotel managers,
are not permitted to betray guests to law enforcement—even when they do
so voluntarily, even when it is they, not police officers, who perform the
searches in question.100 Here, as in Ferguson, something about the
underlying relationship makes it normatively inappropriate to speak of trust
being “misplaced.” Just as it would misconstrue the act of giving a urine
sample to a doctor to conclude that a patient has “assumed the risk” of
betrayal by her doctor, it also misunderstands the act of leaving room keys
at the front desk of a hotel to conclude that a hotel guest has “assumed the
risk” of betrayal by hotel staff. In both settings, widespread expectations
are to the contrary.
D. An Objection: State Agency
Very well—but even supposing these heterodox interpretations succeed,
and the Court truly has picked out relationships with doctors and hotel
managers for heightened protection, there is still an elephant in the room.
What does it mean to say that private actors, cooperating with law
enforcement of their own volition, are bound by the Fourth Amendment?
The first principle of nearly all constitutional law is that the Constitution
constrains state action, not private action. Taking this principle seriously,
how can the fiduciary rule get off the ground? If Ferguson and Stoner
stand for the proposition that certain types of private actors are bound by
the strictures of the Constitution, perhaps the proper inference is simply that
Ferguson and Stoner are wrong.
Although other, more overtly normative responses are conceivable,101 the
simplest response is that Fourth Amendment law has long contained a “state
reach when hotel staff searched a guest’s room); Glass v. State, 696 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2010) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation for maid to report contraband
witnessed in hotel room).
100. See Young, 573 F.3d at 720–21; United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 698–700 (6th
Cir. 1997). In Allen, the court held that the defendant lacked an expectation of privacy in his
hotel room because he had been locked out of the room when management learned that he
was using it to store contraband. But in so holding, the court also suggested that a search
carried out by hotel management, before locking defendant out of the room, would have
been subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny notwithstanding Jacobsen. Id. at 699 (“Unlike
the package in Jacobsen, however, which ‘contained nothing but contraband,’ Allen’s motel
room was a temporary abode containing personal possessions. Allen had a legitimate and
significant privacy interest in the contents of his motel room . . . . [T]his Court is unwilling
to extend the holding in Jacobsen to cases involving private searches of residences.”
(quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984))); see also United States
v. Paige, 136 F.3d 1012, 1020–21 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying the same reasoning—and
refusing to extend Jacobsen on the same grounds—in the context of a home, when the owner
let a handyman in to perform repairs on the roof).
101. It is possible, for example, to answer the state action challenge by severing duties
from remedies and arguing that even if “Fourth Amendment fiduciaries” are not bound by
the Constitution (due to their private status), the exclusionary remedy (and perhaps also civil
remedies) should be available to defendants whose incrimination was built on cooperation
between fiduciaries and law enforcement. Normally, we think of constitutional right
violations (and resulting remedies) in one-to-one correspondence with constitutional duties.
If A claims that B violated his constitutional rights, the meaning of A’s grievance is that B
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agency” principle—an appreciation of the fact that private actors sometimes
become extensions of law enforcement and that, when they do, the Fourth
Amendment’s protections come back into play. In this light, the fiduciary
rule does not undermine the state action requirement. It merely provides a
more realistic—and normatively appealing—gloss on what it means for
private actors to operate as “state agents.”102
As it stands, the case law about when private actors operate as state
agents is checkered at best. The Supreme Court has been virtually silent on
the matter,103 and appellate courts have yet to converge on clear standards.
Everyone seems to agree that if a private actor is legally required to assist
had a duty (to A) that B failed to discharge. But this relationship between rights, remedies,
and duties is contingent, not necessary. In fact, there are times when constitutional rights are
violated, and remedies are available, despite the fact that the party initially responsible for
the violation, in light of her status as a private actor, has no corresponding constitutional
duty.
One clear example is ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment has
long been understood to ensure that criminal defendants receive adequate legal
representation. One implication of this guarantee is that states must fund representation for
indigent defendants. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364–65 (2010); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340–41 (1963). But another implication is that when a
defendant—any defendant—does not receive effective assistance from competent counsel,
she has constitutional recourse: under some circumstances, she can demand a new trial;
under other circumstances, she can revive expired plea deals; and so forth. See, e.g.,
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012) (holding that a defendant who was never
informed of a favorable plea deal should be allowed to reconsider the deal and have it
reinstated nunc pro tunc); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (clarifying that the Sixth
Amendment applies to plea bargains); Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir.
2001) (granting a new trial due to ineffective assistance when counsel failed to strike a juror
who admitted bias). Crucially, these constitutional remedies are available whether the
attorney is in private practice or employed by the government. No one believes—nor would
it make normative sense to suggest—that Sixth Amendment remedies should hinge on that
distinction or that, by choosing to hire private counsel rather than work with a public
defender, a criminal defendant waives her right to constitutional remedies in the event of
ineffective assistance. Who signs the lawyer’s paycheck is irrelevant. The Constitution
forbids the state from subjecting an inadequately represented defendant to (certain forms of)
criminal liability, whether or not a state actor provided the representation. Likewise, perhaps
in the Fourth Amendment setting, although information fiduciaries are not bound by the
Fourth Amendment (just as private attorneys are not bound by the Sixth), law enforcement is
prohibited from relying on—and prosecutors, from introducing—evidence procured by
particularly intrusive means, whether or not a state actor was initially responsible for the
intrusion.
102. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment is
“inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge
of any governmental official’” (emphasis added) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.
649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))).
103. Jacobsen is one of the few cases on point, and because it held that the FedEx
workers were not government agents, it ultimately sheds little light on what such agency
consists of. The only other major Supreme Court case is Skinner, which held that a private
railway was a state agent when it screened its employees for drug use, due to the extensive
regulations related to such screening. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text. For a
possible explanation as to why the private search doctrine has received comparatively little
elaboration, see Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV.
643, 662 (2013) (arguing that the private search rule has fused together with the plain view
rule, such that “private searches” are really just a subset of cases in which a law enforcement
official becomes alerted to something incriminating through no action of her own).
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the police, the private actor becomes a state agent.104 Likewise, there
appears to be consensus that when private actors receive monetary
compensation (or other quid pro quo consideration) for assisting the police,
they should be treated as state agents.105 Less clear are cases where
assistance is neither instigated nor compensated by the state but nonetheless
reflects an endogenous desire on the part of a private actor to aid law
enforcement. Some courts express support for the view that “law
enforcement motivation” can suffice, on its own, to transform otherwiseprivate activity into a Fourth Amendment search.106 Other courts
disagree.107 And some opt for a split-the-difference approach, one that
104. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (holding that it
constituted a “search” when a private railroad company performed urine tests on its
employees pursuant to a federal statute). The principle reaches beyond formal compulsion.
It also encompasses situations where law enforcement provides substantial support to an
otherwise-private search. See id. at 614–15 (applying Fourth Amendment scrutiny to drug
testing carried out by private railway companies, due to the existence of federal regulations
that facilitated the testing); United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829 (8th Cir. 2013)
(holding private investigative activity can qualify as a Fourth Amendment search, even if not
formally compelled, insofar as the government “demonstrate[s] a strong . . . preference for
[it]”); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although a wholly private
search falls outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted by private
individuals at the instigation of a government officer or authority constitutes a governmental
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that an
anonymous hacker’s search for child pornography did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
despite being a crime, because the government did not “participate[]” in the search, but
noting that the analysis would be different in the event that the government compensated the
hacker); United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a technician’s
discovery of files on defendant’s computer, “made pursuant to . . . maintenance work” that
“[t]he Government had no knowledge [of]” and for which it paid the technician no “reward,”
is not protected by the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 848 (7th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a FedEx employee with a predilection for searching customers’
packages was not operating as a state agent because, inter alia, the employee had “never
worked as an informant for the DEA, ha[d] never been rewarded by the DEA for his aid, nor
even discussed with law enforcement authorities what to look for” (emphasis added)).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
for a search to be private, “the intent of the private party conducting the search [must be]
entirely independent of the government’s intent to collect evidence for use in a criminal
prosecution” (quoting United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 418 (6th Cir. 2008))); United
States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing, as one variable in determining whether
a search is truly private, “the extent to which the private party aims primarily to help the
government or to serve its own interests”); United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th
Cir. 1990) (an otherwise-private search meets with Fourth Amendment scrutiny if “its
purpose [is] to elicit a benefit for the government in either its investigative or administrative
capacities”); see also Joshuah Lisk, Comment, Is Batman a State Actor?: The Dark Knight’s
Relationship with the Gotham City Police Department and the Fourth Amendment
Implications, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1419, 1431–32 nn.65–72 (2014) (discussing the
applicability of the private search doctrine to searches carried out exclusively for a law
enforcement purpose).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1053–54 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
that even if a bookkeeper was “motivated, to some extent, by an urge to help the
government, either as a means of protecting herself through the prospect of immunity or by
the ‘simple but often powerful convention of openness and honesty,’” that “is not enough to
make her a government agent” in the absence of instigation by law enforcement (quoting
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971))); United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d
1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1996) (for a private search to constitute state action, “the
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regards “law enforcement motivation” as one potentially—but not
necessarily—dispositive variable in the analysis.108
Against this backdrop, the fiduciary rule can be understood as a way of
designating a particular type of private activity—the voluntary assistance of
law enforcement by information fiduciaries—as de facto state action. So
understood, the fiduciary rule overlaps analytically with the idea of
“entwinement” that the Court has developed in other settings that pose
difficult issues of state action. In the bankruptcy context, for example, the
Court has construed the wrongful attachment of property (in anticipation of
bankruptcy) as state action for the purpose of bringing due process
claims.109 Accordingly, it has allowed § 1983 actions to proceed not only
against the judicial officers who wrongfully issue writs of attachment but
also against a private actor who wrongfully requests a writ of attachment.
In essence, the Court’s reasoning was that because the request for a writ is
what puts the wheels of attachment in motion, the request qualifies, by
itself, as state action—even if not instigated by the government.110
government . . . must . . . affirmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action,” or
put otherwise, the question turns on whether “the government coerces, dominates or directs
the actions of a private person” (emphasis added) (quoting Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787,
796 (10th Cir. 1989))).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Momoh, 427 F.3d 137, 140–41 (1st Cir. 2005)
(enumerating the following factors as relevant in distinguishing private and government
action for Fourth Amendment purposes: “the extent of the government’s role in instigating
or participating in the search, its intent and the degree of control it exercises over the search
and the private party, and the extent to which the private party aims primarily to help the
government or to serve its own interests” (quoting Pervaz, 118 F.3d at 6)); United States v.
Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003) (describing the state agency test as a “factintensive inquiry” that asks “whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the
intrusive conduct and whether the private party’s purpose for conducting the search was to
assist law enforcement efforts or to further her own ends” (quoting United States v. Feffer,
831 F.2d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1987))).
109. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 341–42 (1969).
110. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 933 (1982) (explaining that, in the
typical case involving the attachment of property by a creditor, although “state agents aid[]
the creditor in securing the disputed property[,] . . . the federal [due process challenge]
ar[ises] in litigation between creditor and debtor in the state courts and no state official [i]s
named as a party,” but that this fact does not frustrate the federal court’s ability to
“entertain[] and adjudicate[] the defendant-debtor’s claim that the procedure under which the
private creditor secured the disputed property violated federal constitutional standards of due
process”); id. at 941 (“[W]e have consistently held that a private party’s joint participation
with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party
as a ‘state actor’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id. at 927 n.6 (“Joint action
with a state official to accomplish a prejudgment deprivation of a constitutionally protected
property interest will support a § 1983 claim against a private party.”). For other cases along
these lines, see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296
(2001) (stating that a private actor is subject to the Constitution “when a private actor
operates as a ‘willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents’” (quoting
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941)); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (“[The] State . . . can
be held responsible for a private decision . . . when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert . . . .”); Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (explaining that “[c]onduct that is formally ‘private’ may become
so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as
to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action,” and applying
the principle to a municipality’s acting as trustee to a private estate). For further background
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So, too, in the law enforcement setting: a private actor that assists the
police voluntarily is no less “entwined” with an inherently public function
than she would be if the police were compelling her cooperation. It is
unclear in principle, and the Court has offered no convincing explanation in
practice, why chronology—who initiates the entwinement—should drive
the analysis. If the concern is about private actors using the machinery of
state power to imperil the interests of other private actors, it would seem
more natural to focus on the presence (or absence) of entwinement as such,
not on its origin. That is, it would seem more natural to focus on whether
the private actor in question actually was entwined with law enforcement,
instead of how the entwinement came about.111 Indeed, this is exactly what
some appellate courts have done by applying Fourth Amendment scrutiny
to private action simply because it stemmed, in the first instance, from a
desire to aid law enforcement.
For reasons explained more fully below, I believe these courts go too far.
There are both normative and pragmatic reasons to leave private actors free,
as a general matter, to assist the authorities, which is exactly why the
misplaced trust rule makes sense as a default.112 But even if the
entwinement principle should not apply to all voluntary cooperation with
law enforcement, it should certainly apply—as I argue below—to voluntary
cooperation by information fiduciaries. When information fiduciaries step
into the shoes of law enforcement, they have the capacity, because of their
on the “entwinement” principle, see Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of
Expression in the Age of Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 152–53 (2014).
111. Another way to put this point would be that limiting the ability of information
fiduciaries to share information with law enforcement is, in practice, really just a way of
constraining the way law enforcement officials gather information. In other words,
constitutional protection actually attaches to the receipt of evidence, not to its transmission;
the rule prohibits law enforcement from, for example, capitalizing on a doctor’s decision to
betray her patient. Or, more exactly put, the rule requires that law enforcement, in order to
capitalize on a doctor’s decision to betray her patient, must ensure that the overall process of
collection and disclosure complies with the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness”
requirement. Among other things, this framing helps to sow the beginnings of a distinction
between dragnet surveillance programs—like the one described in Ferguson—and garden
variety mandated reporter laws, which obligate doctors (among other actors) to report certain
kinds of dangerous or harmful activity. In those circumstances, the presence of dangerous
behavior acts as an ipso facto Fourth Amendment safeguard, rendering an otherwiseprotected disclosure inherently reasonable. In other words, one way to think about mandated
reporter laws, within the confines of the fiduciary rule, is to say that reporting does amount
to a search, but the search complies with the Fourth Amendment. See Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86–91 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining why, in his
view, Ferguson does not reach mandated reporter laws).
112. Limiting the ability of private actors to assist law enforcement across the board—
that is, discarding the misplaced trust rule in its entirety—would lead to both normative and
doctrinal problems. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115–16 (2006) (noting a
person’s “interest as a citizen in bringing criminal activity to light”); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488–89 (1971) (safeguarding the ability of one spouse to
intentionally transmit to law enforcement incriminating evidence about the other); cf. On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 756 (1952) (“Society can ill afford to throw away the
evidence produced by the falling out, jealousies, and quarrels of those who live by outwitting
the law. Certainly no one would foreclose the turning of state’s evidence by denizens of the
underworld.”).
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role, to violate expectations of privacy in a different way than other private
actors. The sense in which that is true—and what it means for the
conceptual structure of Fourth Amendment law—are the topics addressed in
the rest of this Article.
II. THE NORMATIVE PUZZLE
The proposition that the law of searches consists of two—and only two—
tiers has hobbled efforts to retool Fourth Amendment doctrine for the
digital age. Beginning from the premise that sharing information results
either in (1) exposure, or (2) misplaced trust, scholars have focused on
dialing protection upward, on explaining why certain cases currently
analyzed under the exposure rule should, instead, be analyzed under the
misplaced trust rule.
As a result, criticism of existing doctrine, for all its fervency, ends up
having limited bite. Although scholars and judges have spared no effort
putting the lash to Smith and Miller, they have left unanswered—indeed,
unasked—how the Fourth Amendment bears on voluntary private action.
The urgency of this question, already on the rise, will only increase with
time. In today’s world, it is not just the occasional service provider—like a
doctor or a hotel manager—who possesses sensitive information about us.
A large (and growing) number of private entities currently have access to
vast (and growing) stores of voluntarily conveyed information about all of
us. If these intermediaries are categorically free to cooperate with law
enforcement—if their use of our information falls totally outside the bounds
of Fourth Amendment scrutiny, as the traditional story would imply—the
erosion of privacy will be unforgiving and swift.
In response, this part draws on the foregoing doctrinal analysis to
develop a tiered account of constitutional privacy, centered on relationships.
To do so, I draw on the law of fiduciary duties and, in particular, on Jack
Balkin’s concept of “information fiduciaries.”113 The common thread
uniting the two examples from Part I—doctors and hotel managers—is that
both hold sensitive information for the benefit of the would-be suspect or
defendant. For them to share sensitive information with law enforcement
would, therefore, flout an implied limitation on its use.
Ultimately, the question becomes, how can information fiduciaries be
distinguished from other parties—friends, family members, colleagues, and
so forth—with whom we routinely share sensitive information, expecting it
to be kept in (some degree of) confidence? The answer, I suggest, is
twofold. First, we share information with fiduciaries despite the fact that
we have no reason, in the everyday sense of the term, to trust them.
Second, because of the social functions that information fiduciaries serve,
the decision to share sensitive information with them is, practically
speaking, involuntary. In my view, these considerations render informal
systems of social regulation insufficient to ensure integrity, and they make
it necessary for implied legal duties to fill the gap. Before building out this
113. Balkin, supra note 5.
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answer, however, it will be useful to examine where the existing criticism
of Fourth Amendment law stands—and what it has missed.
A. Existing Commentary
To date, the Fourth Amendment reform effort, among both scholars and
lower court judges, has focused on explaining why fact patterns
traditionally analyzed as “exposure” cases should be analyzed, instead, as
“misplaced trust” cases. The effort begins from two conceptually distinct
(though often overlapping) starting points. The first focuses on the type of
information at stake; the second, on the amount of such information.
1. Type of Information
The first approach to reform—primarily aimed at the third-party
doctrine—has been to emphasize the sensitive nature of the information we
share with counterparties today. 1979 is gone. Today, it is not just dialed
numbers being disclosed to telephone companies; it is all manner of highly
personal information being disclosed to internet service providers, social
media sites, and the like—often by virtue of arcane user agreements that
garner our consent only in the thinnest sense of the phrase.114
In response to this reality, scholars have long been clamoring for the
abolition of Smith and Miller and the ill-formed theory of “exposure” on
which they rest.115 Stephen Henderson, for example, regards the third-party
doctrine as “fundamentally misguided,”116 among other reasons because it
fails to distinguish between recipients of sensitive information (such as
friends and loved ones) and conduits of sensitive information (such as
Google).117 In a similar vein, Jed Rubenfeld has argued that the third-party
doctrine, if followed to its logical end, would render “the Fourth
Amendment . . . a hollow shell, because in an increasingly digitized,
networked world with ever-expanding privacy-invading technologies,
virtually all information is exposed to third parties.”118 Indeed, according
to Rubenfeld, even Katz is not safe from the doctrine’s ruinous touch,
because “[e]ven Katz had exposed the seized information to a third
114. See David A. Anderson, Privacy and Fictitious Contracts, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO
11, 13–14 (2009) (explaining the “preposterous[]” way that “law treats our acquiescence [to
form contracts] as if we had bargained with the entity and reached a mutually agreeable
solution”).
115. See generally Colb, supra note 11 (demonstrating how both steps of the logic of the
third-party doctrine—equating risk with invitation and equating large intrusions with small
ones—fall off the bone conceptually). See also Jane Bambauer, Other People’s Papers, 94
TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2572448
(noting that “[t]he third party doctrine may be dismantled soon, and for good reason [as] [i]t
always strained the logic and common sense of search and seizure law”) [http://perma.cc/
C6CE-KNKL]; Selbst, supra note 103, at 668 (describing the third-party doctrine originating
in Smith and Miller as the “favorite villain” of Fourth Amendment scholars).
116. Henderson, Timely Demise, supra note 11, at 40.
117. See id. at 40 & nn.6–8; see also Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the
Sun?: A Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 507, 524–28 (2005).
118. Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 115.
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party,”119 which means, on a strict reading of Smith and Miller, that Katz
lost his expectation of privacy the minute he picked up the phone.120
Furthermore, even if the distinction between “content” and “noncontent”
information successfully distinguished Smith from Katz when the former
came down, the coherence of that distinction has long since fallen to ash.
For in the digital age, “noncontent information may reveal”—and
increasingly does reveal—“as much, if not more, intimate [knowledge]
about users than the content of communications do.”121
Other scholars have focused on drawing analogies outside of Fourth
Amendment law. Susan Brenner, for example, has likened digital service
providers to servants at common law.122 Because the common law
recognized “a concept of ‘shared privacy,’” it understood servants as an
extension of the household; interrogating them—or compelling their
testimony—was equivalent to interrogating or compelling testimony from
other members of the family.123 In a similar vein, Monu Bedi has invoked
the idea of “inter-personal privacy”—an idea that he ties back to
fundamental rights cases, such as Lawrence v. Texas124—to explain why the
aggressive variant of the third-party doctrine offered in Smith and Miller
should not apply to communication over Facebook.125 Bedi argues, in
essence, that because Facebook is a forum in which we exercise our privacy
rights, to exempt information shared with Facebook from privacy protection
would drain those rights of practical meaning.126
Kathy Strandburg has coined a phrase that aptly summarizes the
sensibility underlying these positions: “technosocial continuity.”127 Just as
“the special solicitude for the home and office” in Fourth Amendment law
119. Id.
120. See id. Of course, the Court has not been inclined to construe Smith and Miller this
way—a fact that to some scholars suggests the third-party doctrine is not the sturdy
foundation that appearances imply. See supra note 28.
121. Olivier Sylvain, Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of
Total Surveillance, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 485, 488 (2014); see also Simon Stern, The
Third-Party Doctrine and the Third Person, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 364, 391–92 (2013)
(exploring ways in which “no content” data in fact can embed far more—and richer—
information than “content” data); Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and
Freedom of Association’s Specificity Requirement, 10 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 327
(2014) (exploring the breathtaking sweep of metadata collection efforts today and the
“associational information” they reveal); Jane Mayer, What’s the Matter with Metadata?,
NEW YORKER (June 6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whats-the-matterwith-metadata [http://perma.cc/84PK-VL5W].
Nita Farahany has come up with a
particularly clever example of where the distinction between content and noncontent
information breaks down: situations where it is necessary to dial numbers in order to
navigate a menu. See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1252
(2012).
122. Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75
MISS. L.J. 1, 76 (2005).
123. Id. at 80–81.
124. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
125. Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2–5, 15–36 (2013).
126. Id. at 29–32.
127. Strandburg, supra note 11, at 619.
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stems from the “social functions [those] places perform,”128 new practices
like “social media and cloud computing” should also be recognized for the
social functions they perform and for the “social changes [they have]
occasioned.”129 To safeguard privacy in the digital age, therefore, we must
update the rules that govern shared information, so as to recognize that
sensitive information is shared today with many more entities, and many
different kinds of entities, than ever before. Applying the wooden rule from
Smith and Miller to all such sharing would not only yield undesirable
results, but would also disavow reality. Instead, constitutional rules should
be crafted “in a technosocially continuous manner,”130 which means, in
practice, that they should “build upon” the forms of protection traditionally
associated with the home.131 Put simply, the Fourth Amendment should be
sensitive to social practice and should evolve, accordingly, as social
practice evolves.132
2. Amount of Information
The second approach to reform—which focuses more on traditional
“exposure” cases than the third-party doctrine—has been to highlight the
sheer amount of information we share with counterparties today. The most
prominent advocates of this approach are Danielle Citron and David Gray,
who argue that the digital age is distinctive, as far as privacy is concerned,
128. Id. at 659.
129. Id. at 650.
130. Id. at 658.
131. Id. Similar trends can be ascertained from recent judicial opinions. See, e.g., Riley
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“A phone not only contains in digital form many
sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private
information never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is.”); United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (musing that, in the digital
age, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” due to the fact
that “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course
of carrying out mundane tasks”).
132. This view is widely shared in all privacy scholarship, not just commentary on the
Fourth Amendment. Indeed, one of the benefits of the fiduciary rule, in my view, is that it
incorporates—and packages in doctrinally operational form—the insights of various privacy
theorists that have emphasized the importance of contextual variance in privacy norms. See,
e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF
EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 129–31 (2010) (arguing for an approach to
privacy policy that focuses on “contextual integrity” and attention to the actuality of social
practice); Anita L. Allen, Privacy-As-Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral
Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 866 (2000); Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1093, 1128 (2002) (arguing that “privacy”
is a porous concept and that its meaning and normative salience differs depending on the
context). I am not the first to relate these “context-based” accounts of privacy—which are
pitched at a high level of abstraction and tend to be explicitly normative in character—to
Fourth Amendment doctrine. For perhaps the most ambitious effort along these lines, see
Selbst, supra note 103 (drawing on Helen Nissenbaum’s work on “contextual integrity” and
seeking to make expectations about “information flow” the touchstone of constitutional
privacy); see also Laurent Sacharoff, The Relational Nature of Privacy, 16 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1249 (2012).
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because of the means of data collection available today.133 In a way that
has never been true before, it is now possible (for law enforcement and
private parties alike) to cheaply amass and archive enormous volumes of
information. From this observation, Citron and Gray conclude that the
Fourth Amendment’s scope—the threshold doctrinal question of which
activities qualify, in the first place, as searches—must become responsive to
the “how,” rather than the “what,” of surveillance.134 According to Citron
and Gray, data collected by ordinary means poses no Fourth Amendment
problem. But data collected by enhanced means—means that were
previously unavailable—does pose such a problem. In their words:
There is . . . no Fourth Amendment issue just because investigators collect
a detailed mosaic of personal information on a suspect. Rather, it is the
means that matter. Thus, the Fourth Amendment would not be implicated
if a third party used pen registers or similar technology to gather evidence
for the government because these technologies are too limited to facilitate
the sort of broad and indiscriminate surveillance characteristic of a
surveillance state. By contrast, the data aggregation technologies
deployed by Verizon and other telecommunications companies to provide
the FBI and the NSA with “telephony metadata” for all calls “between the
United States and abroad” and all calls “wholly within the United States,
including local telephone calls” implicate “different constitutional
principles.” By virtue of their scale and scope, these data aggregation
capacities . . . should . . . be subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.135

Other commentators agree. Elizabeth Joh, for example, has made similar
arguments in favor of rethinking the Court’s “abandoned DNA”
jurisprudence.136 In a world where technological advancement has made it
so that “nearly any ‘body particle’ can reveal entirely our genetic
information,” limits should be placed on law enforcement’s ability to
procure such “particles.”137 The upshot of Joh’s view is the same as Citron
and Gray’s: law enforcement is increasingly equipped with means of easily
and cheaply collecting vast amounts of information about citizens—and in
response, the Fourth Amendment must evolve.138

133. See Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013).
134. Id. at 267.
135. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV.
62, 143 (2013) (footnotes omitted); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 141, 147–52 (2014) (exploring the way that technological advances have
rapidly intensified the amount of “public” information that can be seized and stored, putting
normative strain on the “exposure” principle at the heart of much Fourth Amendment law).
136. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Essay, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth
Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006). See generally Erin
Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127
HARV. L. REV. 161 (2013) (discussing the Fourth Amendment status of DNA collection and
the specifically quantitative concerns that it inspires).
137. Joh, supra note 136, at 859–60.
138. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing By Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment,
89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (arguing that the mosaic theory leads to
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The quantitative approach, alternatively called the “mosaic theory,” also
appears to be gaining traction in the courts.139 Although United States v.
Jones was resolved (famously or infamously, depending on one’s view) on
trespass grounds, five Justices seemed poised to resolve the case on
Furthermore, a unanimous Court recently
quantitative grounds.140
expressed support for the “quantitative privacy” view in Riley v.
California,141 which held that, incident to an arrest, the police may not
engage in the suspicionless search of a smart phone’s contents.142
Indeed, Riley offers a good example of a setting in which the quantitative
and qualitative approaches coalesce, as they often do. The problem with
allowing law enforcement to examine the contents of smart phones could be
stated in two different, if overlapping, ways.143 To begin with, smart
phones contain all sorts of sensitive information; by perusing someone’s
phone for just a handful of minutes, I can learn many intimate details of
their life. Secondly, smart phones contain an enormous volume of
information; in a different era, amassing the amount of data currently stored
on smart phones today would have required invasive and prolonged
investigation.
considerable line-drawing problems and fails to capture the stakes of Fourth Amendment
protection).
139. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954–57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that constitutional privacy doctrine should change in response to law
enforcement-empowering technologies); ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 822–23 (2d Cir.
2015) (“[R]ules that permit the government to obtain records and other information that
consumers have shared with businesses without a warrant seem much more threatening as
the extent of such information grows.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945 (No. 10-1259) (Chief Justice Roberts describing the distinction between following a car
around for a few days and tracking the movements via GPS as “the difference between
seeing a little tile and seeing a mosaic”). It also has some support among state supreme
courts (which are, of course, free to fashion greater parameters of protection than those
fashioned by the U.S. Supreme Court). See, e.g., People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 142
(Colo. 1983) (“[A] pen register record holds out the prospect of an even greater intrusion in
privacy when the record itself is acquired by the government, which has a technological
capacity to convert basic data into a virtual mosaic of a person’s life.”).
140. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan).
141. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
142. Id. at 2493. The rhetoric in Riley is noticeably sweeping. As Chief Justice Roberts
put it:
A cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information . . . that
reveal much more in combination than any isolated record. [And] a cell phone’s
capacity allows even just one type of information to convey far more than
previously possible. The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed
through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions.
Id. at 2489.
143. As Chief Justice Roberts aptly summarized the point, “[C]ell phones differ in both a
quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s
person.” Id. And then, once again, emphasizing the confluence:
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished from physical records by
quantity alone, certain types of data are also qualitatively different. An Internet
search and browsing history, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled
phone and could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns—perhaps a
search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD.
Id. at 2490.
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The same confluence is discernible in other Fourth Amendment settings
as well.144 In Kyllo v. United States,145 for example, the Court held that a
search occurred when law enforcement used an infrared scanner to detect
heat emanating from a home.146 Although the majority opinion focused on
the sensitive information that such scanning might yield, given its proximity
to the home—with Justice Scalia waxing somber at the idea of capturing
data about “the lady of the house tak[ing] her daily sauna and bath”147—the
practice is also troubling on quantitative grounds. Imagine if the scanner
were left running for hours or days (or, as in Jones, months) on end. Even
if the scanner picked up nothing particularly sensitive—even if there was
nothing particularly sensitive to pick up—law enforcement might
nevertheless come away with a detailed mosaic of activity in the home.148
B. “Misplaced Trust” Presupposes Trust
Ultimately, whether the fulcrum of reform is qualitative or quantitative,
the goal is the same. The point of the reform effort is to truck cases from
the “exposure” tier to the “misplaced trust” tier. In other words, the point is
to explain why settings in which the Court has found that suspects have no
expectation of privacy should, instead, be treated as settings in which
suspects’ expectation of privacy remains intact, but the expectation can be
violated (with constitutional impunity) by any counterparty to whom the
information has been disclosed. In other words, the point of the reform
effort has been to equilibrate Fourth Amendment protection to the level of
Katz, the Fourth Amendment’s traditional “lodestar.”149 And this makes
sense. In a doctrinal landscape haunted by Smith and Miller, the promise of
Katz—that information voluntarily shared with another person might not
lose all constitutional protection—is a significant promise indeed.
But there is a problem. For all that Katz protects against, the one thing it
avowedly does not protect against is misplaced trust. This leads to major
difficulties in the digital age, when information is “entrusted” to third
parties constantly, at a pace and quantity never before imagined. Today,
most interaction with other human beings, not to mention a ballooning
number of everyday tasks, requires one to share information with countless
third parties whose role—and profit source—is the intermediation of data.
Email providers, social media sites, optimization companies like FitBit and
144. Indeed, in its way, DNA collection is another example of a practice that sounds
alarm on both dimensions. Beyond the quantitative concerns explored above, DNA
collection also raises qualitative concerns, in light of the inherently sensitive nature of
genetic information. Though at some level, this would depend more than other examples on
the particular use to which the captured data was being put.
145. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
146. Id. at 40.
147. Id. at 38.
148. Scalia offers a hypothetical along these lines, in a startling prefiguration of Google
Earth—“a satellite capable of scanning from many miles away [that] pick[s] up only visible
light emanating from a house,” allowing law enforcement to theoretically record everything
visible from outside of a home (e.g., comings and goings) with impunity. Id. at 35.
149. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979).
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Nest Labs, GPS navigation systems—the list is long and growing. The
point is not that these entities are iniquitous. They perform important
services and improve the world. But their presence in our lives—a less and
less optional state of affairs—also makes it necessary to reconsider the role
of the “misplaced trust” rule in Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Consider Gmail. I send an email to my sister, confessing that I stole a
car. In so doing, I have shared information—the same information—with
both my sister and Google. Each now possesses evidence that I stole a car.
After sharing the information, what expectation of privacy, if any, do I
retain? The qualitative and quantitative approaches both supply the same to
this question. By sharing the information with Google, I have not—contra
Smith and Miller—lost all ability to claim a privacy interest in it. Put
simply, it should not be the case that I waive my expectation of privacy in
information simply by disclosing it to Google—just as it is not the case,
under Katz, that I waive my expectation of privacy in information simply by
disclosing it to my sister.
The next question, however, becomes more complicated: How, if at all,
does the Fourth Amendment regulate voluntary transmission of the
information—by my sister or by Google—to law enforcement? In the case
of my sister, the answer is clear: under existing doctrine, she is free to
betray my trust. By telling her that I stole a car, I ran the risk that she
would ultimately prove untrustworthy—that I was unwise to confide in her.
Does the same analysis apply to Google? Under a strict construction of the
misplaced trust rule—which, for reasons explored above, is not only
consistent with Katz but, in some sense, derived from Katz—the answer
would certainly be “yes.” Google is a private actor with whom I have
voluntarily shared information; therefore, it is free to betray me. Along
these lines, consider how Patricia Bellia and Susan Freiwald analyze the
issue in the course of arguing that Smith and Miller should not extend to
stored email. Although they argue that using an email storage client should
not extinguish one’s expectation of privacy in the content of email outright,
Bellia and Freiwald go on to conclude that
if [an email provider] chooses to disclose the [content of a user’s email] to
the government without requiring a warrant, the user cannot complain.
When the user assumed the risk that the intermediary would discover
incriminating information or property in the course of its business, she
also assumed the risk that the intermediary would choose to turn that
information over to the government. If the user mistakenly trusted the
intermediary to protect its incriminating information, there is no reason
for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust.150
150. Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored Email, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 121, 167 (2008). Resolving the question this way, Bellia and
Freiwald made explicit what is, in other scholars’ accounts, only latent. See Tokson, supra
note 11, at 585 n.26 (compiling sources to this effect). In passing, it bears noting that Bellia
and Freiwald’s account has an interesting wrinkle. Analytically, the core proposition on
which their view rests is the following: when people use services run by “third party
intermediaries,” they retain an expectation of privacy against the state, but they “lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to those third party intermediaries who
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This analysis certainly scores points for candor. But I want to suggest
that it is both (1) normatively uncomfortable, and (2) in tension with the
reasoning of Ferguson and Stoner. First, the normative point is not difficult
to see. Under Bellia and Friewald’s analysis—which flows from Katz and
tracks the misplaced trust rule—it would be constitutional for Google (or an
entity like it) to archive and mine all user data, running sophisticated
analytics designed to unearth criminal behavior, and to submit the results to
law enforcement (which could then sustain search warrants). Indeed, not
only would this be constitutional; it would not even trigger constitutional
scrutiny, because, under the misplaced trust rule, no Fourth Amendment
search would have occurred. Making matters worse, the hypothetical is not
genuinely hypothetical.
Today, many intermediaries do assist law
enforcement in ways like this. The assistance most commonly takes the
form of ferreting out child pornography,151 but there is little reason, in
principle or in practice, to think that “data vigilantism” will remain
circumscribed to that particular domain.152 Furthermore, even among
intermediaries that have not taken up the law enforcement mantle
voluntarily, virtually all seem to be facing pressure in that direction.153
The bigger issue, however, is that the misplaced trust rule leaves Google
(and other entities like it) free to use customer information this way despite
the fact that, practically speaking, the information was never actually
“entrusted” to Google in the manner the rule has in mind. When a user
shares information with Google—like when a patient shares information
with a doctor or a guest shares information with a hotel manager—she is
engaged in what I will call “arm’s length entrustment.” Unlike, say,
discover information in the course of exercising their rightful access to[,] [for example,] the
users’ packages, storage lockers, rental properties, or stored e-mail accounts.” Bellia &
Freiwald, supra, at 166. Curiously, the only authority cited for this proposition are cases in
which someone loses his expectation of privacy because the fiduciary relationship has
expired, which would seem at least ambiguous—if not actively counterproductive—to their
position. Id. at 166 n.184.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 830 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that
AOL was not operating as an agent of law enforcement when it voluntarily monitored user
email for the purpose of assisting with criminal investigation); United States v. Cameron,
699 F.3d 621, 637–38 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding likewise with respect to Yahoo!); United
States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 367 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding same as to AOL); see also
Hoofnagle, supra note 3, at 600–07 (discussing the data technology available to mainstream
companies today).
152. Perhaps the best—and most chilling—argument along these lines comes from
fiction. See DAVE EGGERS, THE CIRCLE (2013) (imagining a world in which a Google-like
entity turns its sights toward, among other things, predictive analytics about criminal
behavior).
153. For obvious reasons, this is difficult to quantify—the whole point of many of these
programs is secrecy. But if recent revelations about the ubiquity of national security letters
and so forth are any indication, pressure from law enforcement is incredibly widespread. See,
e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Warrant Canaries and Disclosure by Design: The Real Threat to
National Security Letter Gag Orders, 124 YALE L.J. F. 158 (2014). To be clear, compliance
with, for example, national security letters falls beyond the scope of my concern here
because it is clearly instigated by law enforcement and, therefore, even under existing
doctrine, not purely private action. The point is simply that, given the reality of pressure
today, it is easy to imagine a climate tomorrow in which cooperation is voluntary (rather
than compliant), but the upshot for privacy is the same.
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siblings, Google and its users have no preexisting trust relationship. The
reason a user shares information with Google has nothing to do with their
relationship; rather, it is the precondition of using Gmail, just as sharing
information with a doctor is the precondition of obtaining medical care, and
sharing information with hotel staff is the precondition of renting a room.
Furthermore, all three actors serve social functions that make sharing
information with them practically involuntary. If I need medical care, I
have no choice but to consult a doctor. If I need lodging, I have no choice
but to find a hotel. Likewise, with email, if I wish to participate fully in the
digital world—an increasingly unavoidable decision given the realities of
social and professional life—I must engage with Internet Service Providers
(ISPs).
This segues to the second difficulty with applying the misplaced trust
rule to an entity like Google: it runs directly into Ferguson and Stoner.
Consider Bellia and Friewald’s final sentence—“[i]f [a] user mistakenly
trusted the [ISP] to protect its incriminating information, there is no reason
for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust”154—as a
template. On this logic, the proper analysis in Ferguson would have been
as follows: “[I]f [a pregnant woman] mistakenly trusted [her doctor] to
protect [the] incriminating information [contained in her urine], there is no
reason for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust.” And
similarly, in Stoner: “[I]f [a hotel guest] mistakenly trusted [hotel
employees] to protect incriminating information [in his room], there is no
reason for the Fourth Amendment to protect that misplaced trust.” For the
reasons explained at length in Part I, neither of these formulations is faithful
to the logic of Ferguson and Stoner. In both cases, the upshot was that the
defendant did not run the risk of misplaced trust. Rather, the third party’s
decision to voluntarily assist law enforcement fell within the bounds of
Fourth Amendment protection because the Court recognized that “trust,” in
the everyday sense, was not present in these relationships at all. Instead,
sensitive information had been “entrusted” at arm’s length, and the decision
to engage in arm’s length entrustment was, in a practical sense,
involuntary.155
Distinguishing between (1) the presence of genuine trust, and (2) the act
of practically involuntary, arm’s length entrustment not only helps to draw
out the commonalities among doctors, hotel staff, and ISPs, but it also helps
to pinpoint exactly what went wrong in Smith and Miller. Although these
cases have inspired no shortage of vitriol, the foregoing analysis of arm’s
length entrustment makes clear that commentators have actually been too
forgiving of the cases’ common flaw. If, as Ferguson and Stoner (and
154. See supra text accompanying note 150.
155. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Implicit in
the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice. At least in the third-party
consensual surveillance cases, which first incorporated risk analysis into Fourth Amendment
doctrine, the defendant presumably had exercised some discretion in deciding who should
enjoy his confidential communications. By contrast here, unless a person is prepared to
forgo use of what for many has become a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help
but accept the risk of surveillance.” (citations omitted)).
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normative intuition) suggest, arm’s length entrustment generates more
Fourth Amendment protection than disclosure to a genuinely trusted party,
Smith and Miller are not just wrong but backward; they regard arm’s length
entrustment—precisely because it is arm’s length—as deserving of less
Fourth Amendment protection. Therein lies the crucial error.
This element of backwardness came explicitly to the fore in Smith. In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun distinguished Smith from Katz on
the grounds that people have much less reason to trust a phone company
than they have to trust a person on the other line of a call.156 As Justice
Blackman put it, “it is too much to believe that telephone
subscribers . . . harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial
will remain secret,”157 in implicit contrast to the expectation—codified in
Katz—that telephone subscribers’ actual conversations will remain secret.
Viewed in this light, Justice Blackmun’s logic is appealingly
straightforward: because phone companies are less trusted than listeners,
disclosures to phone companies (dialed numbers) should carry a lesser
expectation of privacy than disclosures to listeners on the other line. In
other words, there is a clear, linear relationship—according to Justice
Blackmun—between trust and privacy protection.
Many commentators find Justice Blackmun’s analysis in Smith
unconvincing, to put it mildly. I am among them. But it is important to be
precise about why Blackmun’s analysis fails. The problem is not that
Justice Blackmun (and the rest of the Court) hallucinated a distinction
between sharing information with another person and sharing a dialed
number with the phone company. That distinction is a real one; I do have
less reason, generally speaking, to trust my phone company than I have
(again, generally speaking) to trust people to whom I elect to talk on the
phone. The problem is the next step in Justice Blackmun’s reasoning.
From the observation that people trust phone companies less than they trust
other human beings, Justice Blackmun drew the wrong inference. In fact,
he drew the diametrically wrong inference. Our lack of trust in phone
companies, far from eroding constitutional protection, should have
increased it. In short, what Justice Blackmun failed to appreciate—and
what Ferguson and Stoner make clear—is that, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, protection does not always correlate positively to trust. At times,
the correlation inverts, and relationships predicated on arm’s length
entrustment of information carry greater protection than relationships
predicated on genuine trust.

156. Id. at 743 (majority opinion).
157. Id. For the reasons explored in Part I, Justice Blackmun could not have meant
“remain secret” to mean “not disclosed to another party”—the whole point was that both
pieces of information (the contents of the call and number dialed) had already been disclosed
to another party. Furthermore, the question was how to think about the significance of the
disclosure.
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III. WHO ARE FOURTH AMENDMENT FIDUCIARIES?
Ultimately, the claim is quite straightforward. Under conditions of
practically involuntary, arm’s length entrustment, one should be able to
expect that shared information will be used only for limited purposes and
certainly not to expose one to criminal liability. Indeed, in areas of “private
privacy” law—as opposed to constitutional privacy law—regulators have
already begun to recognize the need for implied, fiduciary-style duties to
govern arm’s length entrustment.158 The same is true, I will argue, for
Fourth Amendment doctrine as well.
Jack Balkin has fashioned a term—“information fiduciaries”—to
describe the set of counterparties with whom we have relationships built on
arm’s length entrustment.159 Although Balkin’s analysis has focused
specifically on ISPs, the logic extends beyond that realm.160 In fact, it
reaches all manner of counterparty to whom we entrust “personal [or]
sensitive information” today, and who, because they occupy a status
“analogous to . . . traditional . . . fiduciaries,”161 are obligated to use that
information in ways that benefit us (or at least, that don’t work to our
detriment). Whereas traditional fiduciaries often manage financial assets,
and their duties tend to concern financial transactions, information
fiduciaries manage the “asset” of information, and their duties primarily
concern security and confidentiality. But putting to one side this difference
in the content of duties owed by information fiduciaries as compared to
traditional fiduciaries, their essential nature is the same. The duties
operate, in practice, to constrain information fiduciaries from pursuing their
unbounded self-interest, when doing so would collide with the interests of
beneficiaries—that is, with our interests.162
To appreciate the force of Balkin’s claim, particularly in the somewhat
idiosyncratic setting of Fourth Amendment law, an overview of fiduciary
norms will be useful. In general, fiduciary duties come in two forms: care

158. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 638–42 (2014) (exploring how the FTC uses
“unfairness” as a doctrinal mechanism for enforcing widespread expectations and
substantive privacy norms, notwithstanding the explicit language of privacy policies);
Margot Kaminski, Robots in the Home: What Will We Have Agreed to?, 51 IDAHO L. REV.
661, 674 (2015) (noting that unlike the Fourth Amendment setting, where courts tend to
interpret voluntary sharing of information with a third party as a waiver of privacy interests,
“in the private actor context, they may consider substantive privacy norms even where
consent has technically been granted”); id. at 674–75 & nn.73–77.
159. Balkin, supra note 5.
160. See generally id.
161. Id.
162. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Export of U.S.-Style Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Other
Cultures: Can a Transplant Take?, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 46, 55
(Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003) (“The keystone . . . legal obligation [is] that the fiduciary use
her powers not for her own benefit but for the exclusive benefit of her beneficiary.”); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY LAW § 387 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (explaining that
a fiduciary is obligated “to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected
with his agency”).
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and loyalty.163 A duty of care is an obligation, in essence, to exercise
diligence when making decisions on behalf of a beneficiary.164 A duty of
loyalty, by contrast, is an obligation to resolve conflicts of interest in favor
of the beneficiary.165 These two obligations are conceptually harmonious
but also, in important respects, distinct. For example, suppose that A
manages money for B—a role that carries both a duty of care and duty of
loyalty. Pursuant to her duty of care, A has an obligation to ensure that
investments are not riskier than B desires. To do so, A must be attuned to
B’s appetite for risk (which, in practice, will likely be set by contract), and
she must exercise diligence when reviewing possible investments. Pursuant
to her duty of loyalty, on the other hand, A has an obligation to refrain from
making investments on B’s behalf simply because A stands to benefit from
those investments. For example, suppose that A, in addition to being a
money manager, also owns Company X. If Company X is trying to attract a
new round of funding, A may not pledge B’s assets—to which A only has
access because of their fiduciary relationship—to help capitalize Company
X. Doing so would subordinate B’s interests, which A is supposed to be
safeguarding, to A’s own interests. It would be a form of “self-dealing.”166
Ultimately, both duties respond to the same underlying problem.
Fiduciaries, by virtue of their status, have access to the resources of their
beneficiaries—a position naturally ripe for abuse, rendering informal
mechanisms of accountability insufficient to ensure good behavior.167
163. There is some variance across legal settings, but all formulations seem to
conceptually come back to care and loyalty. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary
Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1262 (2008) (explaining that
corporate fiduciary duties “fall into two broad categories: the duty of loyalty and the duty of
care”); Ethan Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. L. REV. 665, 675 (2009) (describing
care and loyalty as the “two central fiduciary duties”).
164. See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047–49 (1991)
(explaining that the duty of care is not merely a nonharm principle—unlike the duty of
loyalty, it sometimes requires affirmative action on the fiduciary’s part); Elizabeth S. Scott
& Robert E. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2420–21 (1995) (outlining
the contours of the duty of care).
165. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 163, at 1263 (sketching the contours of the duty
of loyalty in broad strokes); Cooter & Freedman, supra note 164, at 1045–55 (examining the
scope of the duty of loyalty, and explaining when and why fiduciaries are permitted to
engage in self-regarding behavior). Naturally, however, the duty of loyalty does not
eliminate the room for self-serving behavior outright. See, e.g., Eileen Scallen, Promises
Broken Vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993
U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 908 (“[C]lassic fiduciary relationships are by no means divorced from
self-serving considerations.”).
166. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 164, at 1054–55 (outlining the general
prohibition on self-dealing, and explaining the limited circumstances in which fiduciaries are
permitted to engage in it).
167. See Leib, supra note 163, at 683 (explaining that fiduciaries “ha[ve] easy access to
important resources of [their] beneficiar[ies],” and that the purpose of fiduciary duties is to
“deter misuse” of those resources); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of
Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (“[F]iduciary relationships form when
one party (the ‘fiduciary’) acts on behalf of another party (the ‘beneficiary’) while exercising
discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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Fiduciary relationships also tend to be “especially difficult to monitor,”
making them particularly “susceptible to abuse.”168 And this, in turn, is
why contract remedies are not enough, standing alone, to vindicate the
normative purpose of fiduciary duties. The point of enforcing fiduciary
duties is not only to make injured parties whole ex post, but it is also to
deter “opportunism” and encourage “bonding” in ways that “facilitate a
beneficiary’s reliance on the trustworthiness of her fiduciary.”169 Put
simply, legal structures are necessary to ensure that fiduciaries refrain from
exploiting the considerable power that flows from their status vis-à-vis
beneficiaries.
These rationales map straightforwardly onto the actors discussed so far in
this Article. Not only are ISPs, for example, privy to large amounts of
sensitive information, but monitoring what they do with that information is
also difficult and costly, especially in the context of metadata and other
“noncontent” information, which users often do not even realize they are
transmitting.170 This is not to say, of course, that users couldn’t be made to
shoulder the costs of monitoring. They certainly could. There is no reason,
in principle, why service providers currently bound by fiduciary
obligations—trustees, for example, or money managers—couldn’t be
bound, instead, exclusively by contractual obligations.171 But that
possibility misses the normative point. The whole purpose of imposing
duties of care and loyalty on (traditional) fiduciaries is that market forces—
as reflected in the outcomes of bargaining—do not lead, on their own, to a
desirable allocation of cost and risk.172
168. Leib, supra note 163, at 683.
169. Id. at 683–84; see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 824–25
(1983) (explaining that a key doctrinal feature of fiduciary law is burden-shifting:
beneficiaries are “entitle[d] . . . to rely on the fiduciary’s trustworthiness,” meaning that in
the event of a lawsuit, a beneficiary “is . . . not required to show that he actually relied on the
fiduciary,” but rather “the fiduciary has the burden of justifying self-dealing transactions”).
170. See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting
that, in the context of cell site data, “it is unlikely that cell phone customers are aware that
their cell phone providers collect and store historical location information”).
171. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty,
36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (“Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no
moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way,
as other contractual undertakings.”); John Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) (describing fiduciary obligations as “unambiguously
contractarian” in nature). But see Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of
Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 880 (1988) (concluding that in spite of the
“elusive nature” of fiduciary duties, “descriptions drawn exclusively from contract principles
are surely mistaken”); Scott Fitzgibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 303, 341–43 (1999) (exploring the shortcomings of the “contractualist”
approach to fiduciary duties).
172. See, e.g., Fitzgibbon, supra note 171, at 341 (exploring the ways in which “fiduciary
affiliations serve different purposes than those known to [market-based] utilitarianism”);
Selbst, supra note 103, at 681 (noting that there is a tendency in debates about privacy to
conflate “the descriptive claim that the market [could] solve the problem” with “the
normative claim that it should [do so]”); see also CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK
158 (2007) (explaining why the “privacy market” tends not to operate efficiently—among
other reasons, because “[w]e rarely have any real ‘relationship’ with the third-party entities
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In other words, even if beneficiaries are theoretically capable of
shouldering the costs necessary to monitor fiduciaries, the point is that they
should not have to. Beneficiaries should be able to rely on the sturdiness of
background legal rules designed to safeguard their interests; this is what
enables beneficiaries to act as though they trust fiduciaries, even though, in
the absence of legal rules, such “trust” would be unwarranted. This sort of
“virtual trust” serves a variety of functions. Perhaps most importantly, it
facilitates candid interaction, which, in the context of something like
medical care or legal assistance, can be paramount to successful outcomes
and, in the context of digital correspondence, allows social life to proceed
organically, without constant fear of disruption. In short, fiduciary duties
relieve us of the burden of determining who, among a particular class of
counterparties, is actually trustworthy; in doing so, they help preserve the
integrity of social life.173
There are, to be sure, some conceptual difficulties that arise in trying to
import fiduciary principles to the Fourth Amendment setting. But those
difficulties are no greater than—and indeed, they ultimately reflect—the
internal tensions of fiduciary law. As Ethan Leib has shown, many, if not
all, of the justifications behind traditional fiduciary duties apply just as
readily (perhaps even more readily) to intimate relationships. Although we
are accustomed to thinking about fiduciary duties in the context of arm’s
length transactions, there is no reason in principle why the same logic—
justifying the use of state power to enforce implied obligations—should not
apply, for example, to promises made by friends. For Leib, then, the proper
doctrinal test for assessing duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality would
be functional, not formal, in nature. It would ask whether a given
relationship “trade[s] upon high levels of trust and leave[s] one party in a
position of domination, inferiority, or vulnerability.”174 If so, that
relationship should enjoy special solicitude.175 Indeed, in certain domains,
the doctrine already takes this sort of functionalist approach to fiduciarystyle obligations—for example, when it ascribes implied duties of
confidentiality to parties that hold themselves out as promising to keep
sensitive information in confidence176 or implied duties of loyalty to parties
that maintain an ongoing course of dealing.177

that acquire our information, possess virtually no bargaining power over them, are often
ignorant of or confused about the third party’s privacy ‘offer,’ and in any event frequently
have no way to opt out of or fine-tune the ‘contract’”); Anderson, supra note 114, at 13–14
(explaining the “preposterous[]” way that “law treats our acquiescence [to form contracts] as
if we had bargained with the entity and reached a mutually agreeable solution”).
173. See supra note 132.
174. Leib, supra note 163, at 672.
175. See id. at 700–20 (especially pages 707–10).
176. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763,
777–80 (2014) (documenting the salience of (1) underlying trust between the parties, and (2)
social custom in the jurisprudence of implied confidentiality).
177. See 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 11 (2009) (“A partnership arises from express or implied
agreement among parties . . . .”). For an example of what this standard means in practice,
see Chenault v. Jamison, 578 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Ala. 1991) (explaining that, if one party to

2015]

FOURTH AMENDMENT FIDUCIARIES

653

Leib’s insight is an important one. And the problem he highlights—a
problem for the law of fiduciary duties writ large—is particularly
pronounced in the Fourth Amendment context. After all, many of the
variables that counsel in favor of treating doctors, hotel staff, or ISPs as
information fiduciaries also counsel in favor of treating friends, family
members, and other intimates the same way. By way of explaining why my
doctor occupies a fiduciary status, for example, I might invoke the
experience (which most of us undoubtedly share) that when I entrust
sensitive information to a doctor, I do not expect that she will betray me. I
feel as though I am telling my doctor something in confidence. But of
course the same is likely to hold true when I tell my friend, sibling, spouse,
or colleague something sensitive. Indeed, it will be the rare case of
disclosure—to any counterparty—when I expect the person to disseminate
the relevant information to others behind my back.
Yet there would be something seriously wrong with a Fourth
Amendment rule that disallowed, for example, supervisors or coworkers
from reporting illegal activity at work. And there would be something even
more seriously wrong with a rule that stopped coconspirators from deciding
to withdraw from inchoate criminal activity178 or that prohibited friends and
family members, for example, from cooperating with law enforcement in
circumstances where they felt impelled—for reasons of conscience or out of
concern for their own safety—to do so.
Adopting rules like this—rules that effectively extend Fourth
Amendment protection to all voluntary cooperation with law
enforcement—would devastate the criminal justice system. Defendants
would always be able to assert an interest in, and potentially forestall or
suppress, the (incriminating) testimony of other parties. All evidence
procured from common areas—homes, cars, offices, computers, and so
Consider the
on—would arouse Fourth Amendment scrutiny.179
a putative partnership is “led to believe . . . that [the other party] intended to be a partner,”
that can be sufficient for the partnership to form).
178. See United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1054 (8th Cir. 2005) (declining to apply
Fourth Amendment scrutiny to a bookkeeper’s decision to testify for the prosecution on the
grounds, inter alia, that the bookkeeper should be free to “protect[] herself” from
prosecution). This commitment is also reflected in, among other places, the “withdrawal”
defense in conspiracy law—which allows a coconspirator to escape liability if he can show
that he took material steps to withdraw from the effort before the commission of the
offense—and the “coconspirator” exception to the rule against hearsay. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(E) (a statement is not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party
and . . . was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy”);
see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1330–31 (2003)
(explaining that the legal system’s facilitation of betrayal among coconspirators originated in
common law immunity doctrine and was designed to ensure that “so long as the . . . witness
made a good faith effort to assist the prosecution he would go free”); id. at 1331–32
(explaining, in a similar vein, that “the law of contracts . . . rightly refuses to enforce
agreements that prevent conspirators from defecting”).
179. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); United States v. Bowers, 594
F.3d 522, 525–27 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that it was a purely private search when
defendant’s roommate and her boyfriend entered defendant’s room, removed a photo album,
and gave it to the police). Naturally, many fact patterns that involve searches by roommates,

654

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

implications of such a world! Uncertainty would loom over every
investigation. The history of virtually all evidence introduced against a
given defendant would be cast into doubt and amenable (theoretically, at
least) to a Fourth Amendment challenge. Criminal investigations would
grind to a halt. In short, there are good reasons to leave private actors free,
in general, to betray one another to law enforcement on pragmatic grounds
certainly, but even on normative grounds. People in possession of
incriminating information about others should have autonomy to use the
information as they see fit.180
The notion of “counterparty autonomy” is important here because it
circles back to the issue of practically involuntary, arm’s length entrustment
discussed above. What distinguishes Fourth Amendment fiduciaries (to
whom the misplaced trust rule does not apply) from everyday
counterparties (to whom it does) is not expectations of confidence; it is
relative power. When it comes to doctors, hotel staff, and ISPs—to name
but a few examples of counterparties that fall into the fiduciary category—
the decision to share information, though not formally mandatory, is
practically inescapable. As such, the same anxieties about “opportunism”
and “suscepti[bility] [to] abuse” that define traditional fiduciary
relationships apply in this setting as well.181 If anything, they apply even
more urgently, given the severe consequences that can flow from law
enforcement investigation (whether or not one is ultimately convicted). In
light of these concerns, the answer, just as in traditional fiduciary
relationships, is to limit the autonomy of certain parties to direct the flow of
information—to law enforcement, in particular—as they see fit.
Beyond shoring up the distinction between Fourth Amendment
fiduciaries and other counterparties, the emphasis on counterparty
autonomy also serves another important goal: it helps explain the origin, in
the first instance, of the misplaced trust rule in Fourth Amendment law.
Although the principle has long been a fixture of doctrine (hence the
discussion in Part I), its rationale has gone oddly unelaborated. Indeed, it
would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the “expectations of privacy”
framework, standing alone, provides no rationale for the misplaced trust
rule. Normally, when A shares information with B, A does not expect—and
sometimes, A precisely does not expect—that the information will travel
further.182 Yet the Fourth Amendment allows B (at least as a default rule)
spouses, and houseguests never even rise to the level of Fourth Amendment scrutiny because
they are so clearly outside the bounds of constitutional protection.
180. See supra note 112 (discussing Supreme Court language to this effect); see also
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 39 (explaining that, as a matter of presumption, “an
individual”—that is, a counterparty—“has an autonomy and free speech interest in choosing
to share information that will often trump any privacy interest” on the part of the sharing
party).
181. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
182. Sherry Colb has documented this issue eloquently and at greater length. See Colb,
supra note 11, at 127–44 (documenting the fallacy that runs through much of the Supreme
Court case law of “equating risk [with] invitation”). Indeed, not only does A, when
disclosing information to B, not typically expect that disclosures will travel further than B,
but there are also likely to be likely to be circumstances in which the opposite inference is
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to transmit the information as B sees fit, notwithstanding A’s expectations.
Why? Counterparty autonomy supplies a full answer to this question.
Generally speaking, B should be able to cooperate with law enforcement
because B has an interest in doing so. Unless B has a specific obligation not
to transmit A’s information—that is, unless B is an information fiduciary—
B should be able to direct the flow of information in her possession.183
At last, then, the big question is, which counterparties are Fourth
Amendment fiduciaries? So far, the Article has offered three examples:
doctors, hotel staff, and ISPs that facilitate digital correspondence. Who
else belongs in the category? First, following Chris Slobogin and others, I
would draw a categorical line—at least for the purpose of establishing
default rules—between individuals and institutions.184 When it comes to
individuals, autonomy over information—the ability to dispose of
information as one pleases—is central to “personhood.”185 In Slobogin’s
words, “the autonomy interest of a putative witness trumps the privacy
interest of a . . . target [of investigation],” because “no person should be
able to prevent another from providing information to the government.”186
Crucially, however, “that analysis”—emphasizing the relationship between
informational autonomy and personhood—“makes sense only when the
third party is a person,” not an institution.187 Why? Because “[a] bank,

more plausible—that A, by disclosing information exclusively to B, expected the disclosure
to limit the ultimate flow of information. Suppose, for example, that A has committed
adultery and his wife is starting to get suspicious. A tells his best friend, B, about the
adultery and asks for B’s help in brainstorming a way to ensure that their other friends—and
most especially, A’s wife—don’t find out. Under circumstances like this, it would be
ludicrous to conclude that because A confided in B, A can no longer expect that his adultery
will stay under wraps: that is precisely what A expects.
183. A similar point can be made about the private search doctrine. One reason we might
protect B’s ability to investigate A—and, if desired, to relay the results of the investigation to
law enforcement—is that B has an interest in doing so. In fact, the private search doctrine is
almost impossible to rationalize on expectation of privacy grounds. Who expects that a
package sent via FedEx will be dismantled by an employee (purposefully or not) and its
contents brought to the attention of law enforcement? Who expects that his computer will be
hacked—itself an illegal act—by an anonymous vigilante keen on unearthing child
pornography? Under an “expectations of privacy” metric, these holdings are scandalous.
But reconceived in terms of counterparty autonomy, they make sense (whether they are
rightly decided is quite another matter).
184. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 172, at 157–60; Bryan H. Choi, For Whom the Data Tolls,
37 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2576948
[http://perma.cc/6SK7-FVRR]; Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1643 (1987) (arguing that
people have “an autonomy-based right to choose to cooperate with the authorities”); see also
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 39 (distinguishing, in broad strokes, between the
autonomy interests of persons and the attenuated autonomy interests of “[i]nstitutional third
parties”).
185. SLOBOGIN, supra note 172, at 159; see also Coombs, supra note 184, at 1642–44
(identifying personhood as the normative rationale for “betrayal” in Fourth Amendment
law).
186. SLOBOGIN, supra note 172, at 159.
187. Id. (emphasis added).
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hospital, or ISP is not denied ‘personhood’ when its ability to turn
information over to the government is restricted.”188
Of course, to say that institutions, generally speaking, have no autonomy
interest in the information entrusted to them does not mean (1) that only
institutions are in this position, or (2) that institutions never have an
interest—of a normatively relevant sort—in cooperating with law
enforcement. Neither proposition is true. To begin with, it is certainly not
the case that all information fiduciaries are institutions. Many flesh-andblood individuals—with whom we transact at arm’s length, usually for
particular services—play that role as well. Whether they do so depends on
the nature of the particular relationship, but the familiar criteria govern.
Doctors, lawyers, repairmen, financial advisors—all of these actors (and
this is certainly not an exhaustive list) are information fiduciaries to the
extent that we entrust information to them for reasons that have nothing to
do with “trust,” in the everyday sense. Rather, we entrust information to
these counterparties because doing so has instrumental value—in spite of,
not because of, the fact that we have no basis to assume they will safeguard
our information. For the reasons discussed above, there are good reasons to
conclude that practically involuntary, arm’s length entrustment carries an
implicit limitation on use: specifically, an implied covenant to avoid using
sensitive information in ways that harm the sharing party.
Moreover, even if institutions—and individuals that play a fiduciary
role—lack an autonomy interest in sharing information with law
enforcement, it does not follow that they have no interest in sharing
information with law enforcement. Interests take many forms. It seems
uncontroversial, for example, that companies should be able to share
information with law enforcement (even companies that otherwise operate
as information fiduciaries) if they reasonably fear that adverse
consequences will flow from not doing so.
For example, if a company can show that the persistence of a customer’s
(or a user’s) criminal activity poses a risk of legal liability for the company,
it should be able to cooperate with law enforcement. For instance, a case
like Stoner would presumably be different—and I think it should be
different—if the hotel room in question were being used to operate a
criminal enterprise, rather than storing nonhazardous contraband.189 Under
those circumstances, the hotel manager might able to convincingly argue
that the criminal enterprise was exposing the hotel to potential liability, in
which case cooperation with law enforcement would certainly be warranted.
The Fourth Amendment does not require businesses to subordinate their
own legal standing to the privacy interests of their customers.190 The same
188. Id.
189. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1963) (holding that a homeowner
relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy when he used his home to run an illegal
venture). Presumably, what is true of expectations of privacy in one’s home would also be
true, a fortiori, of expectations of privacy in one’s hotel room.
190. Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (holding that it does not
violate a defendant’s self-incrimination rights for the government to subpoena records from
the defendant’s accountant, because, among other reasons, an accountant’s “own need for
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reasoning also applies to economic concerns. If a company can show that a
customer’s (or a user’s) criminal activity poses a detrimental risk to
business, this, too, might justify cooperation with law enforcement—though
probably subject to a more stringent evidentiary burden than claims of
imminent criminal or civil liability.191
By the same token, it does not qualify as an objectively reasonable
concern about adverse legal or economic consequences for an institution (or
individual) to claim an overarching interest in “aiding . . . in the
apprehension of criminals.”192 That interest is shared by everyone, equally,
whether or not they operate in a fiduciary capacity. At some level, in fact,
the public’s general interest in “aiding . . . the apprehension of criminals” is
indistinguishable from the autonomy interest that nonfiduciaries have in
disposing of information as they see fit. One of the reasons we safeguard
the ability of private actors to betray one another—apart from the practical
mayhem that the opposite rule would create—is that individuals, as
members of the public, have an interest in seeing wrongdoing redressed.193
The same is not true of information fiduciaries. Crucially, this is not
because it is impossible (or even unlikely) that information fiduciaries wish
to see wrongdoing redressed. It is because information fiduciaries are not
empowered to act on that wish. Surely there are many doctors—and hotel
managers, and ISPs, and so forth—who, when left to their own devices,
would very much prefer to cooperate with law enforcement. The point is
that their preferences are not the salient variable. Our privacy is.194
self-protection [against criminal prosecution] . . . often require[s] the right to disclose the
information given him”).
191. Something of this has already surfaced in the doctrine—though in an undertheorized way—when courts ask if private searches were motivated by legitimate business
interests. See, e.g., United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that
a search, to be private, must serve a purpose “entirely independent of the . . . collect[ion] [of]
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution” (quoting United States v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404,
418 (6th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1431 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that private searches are only private if their purpose is related to business activity, not “to
elicit a benefit for the government in either its investigative or administrative capacities”).
Doctrinally, the standard is fuzzy partly because of its sheer logical indeterminacy. Courts
have not been clear as to whether the absence of a legitimate business condemns a search, or,
instead, whether the presence of a legitimate business interest justifies a search (or something
in between). In any event, it seems safe to conclude that courts should look on claims of
“business interests” with some degree of skepticism, given how easy it is to speculate about
economic loss.
192. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116 (2006) (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971)).
193. Though in particular cases, of course, there may well be other considerations, such
as personal safety, that contribute to an individual’s autonomy interest. This concern is front
and center in the cotenancy cases. Compare id. at 121–22 (holding that if both cotenants are
present, and one invokes his Fourth Amendment rights, that invocation trumps the other’s
consent), with Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134–35 (2014) (holding that the
consent of a cotenant sufficed to justify a search after the other tenant (1) had invoked his
Randolph rights, but (2) had been removed from the premises). With respect to the latter, in
particular, Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court includes numerous rhetorical flourishes about
the importance of leaving law enforcement free to aid victims of domestic violence.
194. Under the framework set forth here (with its emphasis on the institution-individual
divide), the hardest cases are likely to be those that involve agents of information
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CONCLUSION
In the digital age, reforming Fourth Amendment law requires more than
just pruning back an isolated site of doctrinal overgrowth from the late
1970s—overgrowth so extreme that even its enthusiasts do not seem to take
Smith and Miller at face value.195 How could they? The notion that people
“[have] no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties”196 runs directly into Katz, and the conceptual
edifice devised to explain this tension away—the distinction between
“content” and “noncontent” information—has been exposed as a house of
cards. Jurisprudentially, Jones and Riley portend the end of the so-called
“third-party doctrine.” And conceptually, the doctrine has been something
of a mirage all along.
Good riddance—for there are larger monsters to slay. Data is quickly
becoming the main currency of law enforcement, and in a world of
substantial—and growing—intermediation, our data is less and less our
own. To keep clip with these developments, Fourth Amendment law must
begin to think differently about collaboration between law enforcement and
fiduciaries—like employees—who, as individuals, do not have fiduciary obligations to the
sharing party, but who nonetheless operate under the auspices of a fiduciary bond. Hotel
managers and doctors pose few, if any, difficulties in this respect, because these actors,
despite being individuals, do have independent fiduciary obligations to primary parties. The
same considerations that would make it troubling for a hospital to maintain a blanket policy
of cooperating with law enforcement also make it troubling for a doctor to cooperate with
law enforcement in a less systematic way (and likewise, the same considerations that make it
troubling for a hotel, as an institution, to betray guest information to law enforcement also
make it troubling for a hotel manager to do the same).
But consider the following hypothetical. B, a Google engineer, is performing run-ofthe-mill maintenance when he notices strange traffic patterns through A’s Gmail account.
His curiosity piqued, B decides to investigate—and lo and behold, A has been transmitting
child pornography. Under the fiduciary model, Google’s cooperation with law enforcement
certainly triggers (some degree of) Fourth Amendment scrutiny. But what about B’s
cooperation with law enforcement? There are three possible answers. First, B’s cooperation
might always trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny—because B-the-individual is, in effect, an
extension of Google-the-institution. Second, B’s cooperation might never trigger Fourth
Amendment scrutiny—if we think about B as an individual with autonomy interests intact.
Third, B’s cooperation might sometimes trigger Fourth Amendment protections, depending
on whether B was acting in a formal or informal capacity, on Google’s behalf or not.
Normatively, this last answer is probably the most attractive (as middle positions
often are), but its doctrinal plausibility remains to be seen. See United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 126 (1984) (holding that no Fourth Amendment scrutiny is triggered by a
FedEx worker’s decision to search the contents of a package broken while in transit and to
turn discovered contraband over to law enforcement). The “Google engineer” hypothetical
provides an exact analogy to Jacobsen in the digital age. Without purporting to resolve the
puzzle here, suffice it to note that the result in Jacobsen may well have come out
differently—and it almost certainly would have been analyzed differently—if the “private
search” had been pursuant to a FedEx-wide policy to scan and, if necessary, dismantle all
packages that flow through the FedEx system. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Vigilantes and
Good Samaritans, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2657789 [http://perma.cc/G7SE-BAY5].
195. See supra note 28.
196. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(summarizing the third-party doctrine, as traditionally understood); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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the private sector. Traditionally, the rule has been that sharing information,
no matter with whom, invites the danger of misplaced trust. But looking
forward, that rule no longer makes normative sense. Nor, looking
backward, has the rule given rise to consistent application. When the chips
are down, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the misplaced trust rule
to settings where it clashes with social reality. Digital communication is the
most recent—and in today’s world, the most practically pressing—example
of such a setting.
The point of this Article is ultimately quite simple. In settings where
private actors operate as information fiduciaries, law enforcement should
not have carte blanche to demand their cooperation; nor should private
actors that serve as information fiduciaries be free—without bound—to
assist law enforcement voluntarily. Today, we live alongside sprawling
organizations whose purpose, and profit, is fundamentally tied to their use
of information. Our information. Doctrine must adapt to this reality. It
must learn to distinguish between sharing at arm’s length—which occurs as
the precondition of obtaining a socially valuable service—and sharing with
counterparties who are genuinely trusted and whose involvement thereby
gives rise to a risk of misplaced trust. This distinction, like so many that
law confronts in the face of technological change, is at once conceptually
lucid and doctrinally precarious. Is Fourth Amendment law up to the task?
Let us hope so. The future of constitutional privacy depends on it.

